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Who runs first to the bank? 
 
Hubert János Kiss – Ismael Rodriguez-Lara – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia 
 
Abstract  
 
We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors differ in 
their liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the first one, depositors choose the 
level of costly effort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which determines 
the order of decisions. In the second stage, depositors decide whether to withdraw or 
to keep the funds deposited. We consider two different informational environments 
(simultaneous and sequential) that differ in whether or not depositors can observe 
the decision of others during the second stage of the game. 
We show theoretically that the informational environment affects the emergence of 
bank runs and thus should influence the willingness to rush to the bank. We test the 
predictions in the lab, where we gather extensive data on individual traits to account 
for depositors' heterogeneity; e.g. socio-demographics, uncertainty attitudes or 
personality traits. We find no significant differences in the costly effort to arrive early 
at the bank neither across the informational environments, nor according to the 
liquidity needs of the depositors. In the sequential environment, some depositors 
rush to the bank because they are irrational and do not recognize the benefits of 
observability in fostering the coordination on the no-bank run outcome. There is also 
evidence that some depositors rush to keep their funds deposited and to facilitate 
coordination on the efficient outcome. Finally, we document that loss aversion is an 
important factor in the formation of the line. 
 
Keywords: bank runs, coordination problems, endogenous formation of lines, loss 
aversion, risk aversion, experimental economics, game theory, sequential games, 
simultaneous games. 
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Ki rohan a bankba? 
Kiss Hubert János – Ismael Rodriguez-Lara – Alfonso Rosa-Garcia 
Összefoglaló 
 
 
Azt tanulmányozzuk, hogy miként alakulnak ki endogén módon a sorok a bankok 
előtt. A modellünknek két része van. Az elsőben a betétesek megválasztják a költséges 
erőfeszítés szintjét, ami arra szolgál, hogy korán a bankba érjenek. Ez határozza meg 
a későbbi döntések sorrendjét. A második részben a betétesek arról döntenek, hogy 
kivegyék-e a pénzüket a bankból. Két információs környezetet (szimultán és 
szekvenciális) vizsgálunk, melyek abban különböznek, hogy a betétesek 
megfigyelhetik-e más betétesek betétkivételi döntését. Megmutatjuk elméletileg, hogy 
az információs környezet hat a bankrohamok kialakulására és így befolyásolja azt is, 
hogy ki mennyire szeretne a bankba rohanni. Az elméleti predikciókat 
laboratóriumban ellenőrizzük, ahol számos egyéni jellemzőről (szocio-demográfiai 
jellemzők, bizonytalansággal szembeni attitűd, személyiségi jegyek) is adatot 
gyűjtünk, így figyelembe véve a betétesek heterogenitását. Nem találunk szignifikáns 
különbséget abban, hogy ki mennyi erőfeszítést tesz, hogy elsőként érjen a bankba 
sem az információs környezet függvényében, sem a betétesek likviditási igénye 
alapján. A szekvenciális környezetben néhány betétes azért rohan, mert irracionális és 
nem ismeri fel a más döntéseinek megfigyelhetőségéből származó előnyöket. 
Ugyanebben a környezetben arra is találunk bizonyítékot, hogy mások azért rohannak 
a bankba, hogy aztán ne vegyék ki a pénzüket, így elősegítve a koordinációt a 
hatékony kimenetelre. Végül, azt is megmutatjuk, hogy a veszteségkerülés fontos 
tényező a sor kialakulásában. 
Tárgyszavak: bankroham, koordinációs probléma, endogén soralakulás, 
veszteségkerülés, kockázatkerülés, kísérleti közgazdaságtan, játékelmélet, 
szekvenciális játék, szimultán játék 
JEL-kód: C91, D3, D8, G2, J16  
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Abstract
We study how lines form endogenously in front of banks when depositors diﬀer in their
liquidity needs. Our model has two stages. In the ﬁrst one, depositors choose the level of costly
eﬀort they want to exert to arrive early at the bank which determines the order of decisions.
In the second stage, depositors decide whether to withdraw or to keep the funds deposited. We
consider two diﬀerent informational environments (simultaneous and sequential) that diﬀer in
whether or not depositors can observe the decision of others during the second stage of the game.
We show theoretically that the informational environment aﬀects the emergence of bank runs
and thus should inﬂuence the willingness to rush to the bank. We test the predictions in the lab,
where we gather extensive data on individual traits to account for depositors' heterogeneity; e.g.
socio-demographics, uncertainty attitudes or personality traits. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
in the costly eﬀort to arrive early at the bank neither across the informational environments,
nor according to the liquidity needs of the depositors. In the sequential environment, some
depositors rush to the bank because they are irrational and do not recognize the beneﬁts of
observability in fostering the coordination on the no-bank run outcome. There is also evidence
that some depositors rush to keep their funds deposited and to facilitate coordination on the
eﬃcient outcome. Finally, we document that loss aversion is an important factor in the formation
of the line.
Keywords: bank runs, coordination problems, endogenous formation of lines, loss aversion,
risk aversion, experimental economics, game theory, sequential games, simultaneous games.
JEL Class.: C91, D03, D8, G02, J16
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1 Introduction
The last ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007 has shown that bank runs are existing and important
phenomena. In the ﬁrst two years of the crisis, more than 165 banks failed only in the US. In
many instances, the immediate cause of the failure was a bank run. Even large ﬁnancial institutions
like Northern Rock, Bear Stearns, or Washington Mutual experienced runs. Run-like phenomena
have also occurred in the repo market (Gorton and Metrick, 2012) or in bank lending (Ivashina and
Scharfstein, 2010). These events do not only have noteworthy economic and political consequences
(Caprio and Klingebiel, 1999; Laeven and Valencia, 2013; Tooze, 2018), but they are likely to aﬀect
the individuals' well-being as well (Montagnoli and Moro, 2018). Governments all over the world
took actions to restore the conﬁdence in the ﬁnancial sector, by increasing the deposit insurance
coverage or bailing out failing banks. Understanding bank runs is, hence, of ﬁrst-order importance
to ﬁnd the right policy responses to deal with them properly in the future.
Since the seminal paper by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) there is an increasing theoretical,
empirical and experimental literature that has explored why and how bank runs occur. Some studies
highlight the role of policy tools, like suspension of convertibility (Ennis and Keister, 2009; Davis and
Reilly, 2016) or deposit insurance (Madies, 2006; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss et al., 2012;
Peia and Vranceanu, 2017), others investigate the importance of individual characteristics (Gráda
and White, 2003; Kiss et al., 2014b, 2016b; Dijk, 2017; Shakina and Angerer, 2018). There is,
however, a lack of explanations on how the lines are formed in front of the banks. More speciﬁcally,
we have no evidence on what factors aﬀect the depositors' decisions on when to go to the bank. As
Ennis and Keister (2010) point out: "In the Diamond-Dybvig tradition, the order in which agents get
an opportunity to withdraw is assumed to be exogenously given (generally determined by a random
draw). In other words, agents in the model are not allowed to take explicit actions to change their
order of arrival. This assumption is, of course, extreme and, unfortunately, not much is known so
far about the case where it is not made."1 The current paper is an attempt to ﬁll this void in the
literature.
Our study builds on the canonical Diamond-Dybvig framework with two types of depositors:
impatient depositors (who are hit by a liquidity shock and need to withdraw immediately) and
patient depositors (without urgent liquidity needs and who provoke a bank run if they withdraw
1As a result, some theoretical models assume that positions are exogeously determined in a random manner; see,
e.g., Green and Lin (2003); Andolfatto et al. (2007); Ennis et al. (2009).
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immediately). We rely on two diﬀerent information environments (simultaneous and sequential)
that diﬀer in whether or not depositors can observe the decision of others when making their
decisions. The obsevability of actions has been shown to be crucial to depositors' behavior in
empirical (Kelly and O Grada, 2000; Starr and Yilmaz, 2007; Iyer and Puri, 2012; Atmaca et al.,
2017) and experimental studies (Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009; Kiss
et al., 2014a, 2018). There is also evidence that observability of actions aﬀects if a bank run becomes
contagious (Brown et al., 2016; Chakravarty et al., 2014; Duﬀy et al., 2016).2 These papers focus on
the reaction of depositors when they observe the action of others, while leaving aside the question
on whether (and how) this can aﬀect the willingness to arrive early at the bank.
Our ﬁrst informational environment, the simultaneous setup is characterized by the lack of
information about previous decisions, so depositors decide without knowing the decision of preceding
depositors. The second informational environment, the sequential setup represents the opposite,
so depositors observe all previous decisions. Both of these informational environments resemble
conditions akin to bank run episodes that occurred during the last ﬁnancial crisis. For example, the
US bank Washington Mutual experienced massive online withdrawal in September 2008, a so-called
"silent bank run" since the decision of other depositors could not be observed. Arguably, the run
on the UK bank Northern Rock in 2007 was not silent as depositors could see the long lines in front
of the banks and the media covered extensively the run. Our paper highlights that theoretically the
observability of actions is key to understand whether or not bank runs emerge as a coordination
problem, and this should aﬀect the way in which lines of depositors are formed.
Altogether, we consider a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, depositors decide simultaneously
their eﬀort level to arrive early at the bank and the line is formed accordingly: depositors who make
more costly eﬀort to arrive early at the bank (in form of higher bids as we will see), get a position at
the beginning of the line.3 In the second stage, depositors decide whether to keep their funds in the
bank or to withdraw them immediately. When decisions are simultaneous, depositors make their
choices without observing the decision of others, as in the traditional Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
2For a recent literature review on contagion in ﬁnancial networks see Glasserman and Young (2016). Duﬀy (2016),
Dufwenberg (2015) and Kiss et al. (2016a) also present recent advances on experimental ﬁnance, including a discussion
on bank runs.
3We are not aware of any other paper that endogeneizes the order of decisions in a bank run model, but there
have been other attempts in the literature, including models of herding, war of attrition or investment environments.
For instance, Wagner (2018) studies war of attrition, Brindisi et al. (2014) investigate an investment environment,
while Ivanov et al. (2013) examine a herding game.
3
setup. There are multiple equilibria in this setting. In the eﬃcient equilibrium resulting in no bank
run, patient depositors keep their funds deposited. In the ineﬃcient equilibrium with a bank run,
patient depositors withdraw their funds immediately, which is optimal given that the rest of patient
depositors withdraws as well.4 When decisions in the second stage are sequential, it is possible to
observe all previous decisions. In this setting, we show that there is a unique equilibrium without
bank runs. This occurs because the observability of actions solves the coordination problem, thus it
is possible to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium (Kiss et al., 2012; Kinateder and Kiss, 2014).5
The rationale for this result is that patient depositors, by keeping their money in the bank when
decisions are observable, are able to induce other patient depositors to keep their funds deposited
as well. This, in turn, implies that any withdrawal that is observed should be attributed to an
impatient depositor who needs the funds immediately.
We rely on backward induction to derive our predictions for the ﬁrst stage of the game. In the
simultaneous setup, beliefs determine which equilibrium is chosen. As a result, depositors (both
patient and impatient ones) should only make a costly eﬀort to arrive early at the bank if they expect
a bank run, and those who run should withdraw their funds. If no bank run is anticipated, then no
costly eﬀort should be made to rush to the bank. In the sequential environment, given the unique
no-run equilibrium depositors should make no eﬀort to arrive early at the bank regardless of their
types (patient or impatient). However, the observation of withdrawals can perturb the beliefs of
depositors about the occurrence of bank runs. Kiss et al. (2018) ﬁnd that patient depositors tend to
run when decisions are observable because they attribute the observed withdrawals to other patient
depositors. Kiss et al. (2018) refer to these bank runs that occur after observing previous decisions as
panic bank runs. Then, if depositors expect a panic bank run, both patient and impatient depositors
have incentives to make costly eﬀorts in order to arrive earlier at the bank.6
We test these predictions by means of a laboratory experiment. When comparing the behavior in
the simultaneous and the sequential environment, our data suggest that decisions on arriving early
4Similarly to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the bank in our setup does not have any fundamental problem, so bank
runs arise due to coordination problems among the depositors. Although fundamentally weaker banks are more likely
to be aﬀected by bank runs, there is empirical evidence that even fundamentally healthy ﬁnancial intermediaries
suﬀer bank runs (e.g. Davison and Ramirez, 2014; De Graeve and Karas, 2014). In fact, fundamentals are important
but leave unexplained part of the banking failures (e.g. Ennis, 2003; Boyd et al., 2014).
5Arifovic et al. (2013) provide experimental evidence that the diﬃculty of coordination aﬀects the emergence of
bank runs.
6As we discuss below, the decision of patient depositors will depend on their beliefs regarding the rationality of
other patient depositors.
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at the bank are not related with the coordination on the bank run equilibrium. This occurs because
patient depositors make costly eﬀorts both in the simultaneous and the sequential environments.
In the simultaneous environment, we ﬁnd that the depositors' beliefs about the occurrence of bank
runs predicts their withdrawal decisions (i.e., depositors are more likely to withdraw when they
expect a bank run). However, these beliefs do not inﬂuence their decision on when to arrive at
the bank (i.e., patient depositors who want to withdraw their funds in the simultaneous setting do
not arrive earlier at the bank than those who want to keep their funds deposited). In addition,
we do not ﬁnd diﬀerences in the costly eﬀorts to arrive early across liquidity types (patient vs.
impatient) in the simultaneous environment. Overall, these ﬁndings support the approach used in
the theoretical literature that assumes a random formation of the line in the absence of information
about the decision of other depositors. In the sequential environment, we ﬁnd that two factors can
explain partly the costly eﬀort made by patient depositors. On the one hand, there is evidence that
some patient depositors are irrational and rush to withdraw their deposit even when they know that
their withdrawal decision is observable. On the other hand, we ﬁnd a substantial share of subjects
that seem to anticipate that bank runs may occur because of panic. These subjects make costly
eﬀorts to arrive early and keep the funds deposited so as to facilitate coordination on the eﬃcient
outcome.
We use our experiment to glean some additional insights into the behavior of depositors. Start-
ing with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) most of the theoretical studies on bank runs assume that
depositors are homogeneous, except for their liquidity needs. However, depositors in real life dif-
fer in a myriad of ways. To account for heterogeneity, we measure a host of individual traits of
the participants in the experiment. More concretely, we collect data on the age, gender, attitude
toward uncertainty (risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion), cognitive abilities, overconﬁ-
dence, income, trust in institutions, personality traits (Big Five and Social Value Orientation) of the
participants. Our strong interest in the attitude toward uncertainty is motivated by the fact that
in many countries regulation requires banks to draw a risk proﬁle of the customers (see, e.g., the
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID) in the EU, Article 25/2 of European Parlia-
ment (2014) or Article 30/1 of (European Parliament, 2016).) In our analysis, loss aversion indeed
emerges as an important factor to explain depositors' decisions and the formation of the line. This
is in line with recent experimental ﬁndings (e.g. Haigh and List, 2005; Trautmann and Vlahu, 2013;
Rau, 2014; Huber et al., 2017) suggesting that loss aversion is important to ﬁnancial decisions. Our
result suggests that theory should consider to incorporate loss aversion into models of bank runs.
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Our results complement empirical studies analyzing how individual traits aﬀect depositors' be-
havior. Gráda and White (2003) analyze two banking panics in New York in the XIX century. The
ﬁrst one in 1854 was due to contagion and resulted in less wealthy and less sophisticated depositors
withdrawing their funds ﬁrst. In contrast, the bank run in 1857 was due to fundamentals. In this
case, the more wealthy and sophisticated depositors began to withdraw their funds ﬁrst, as they
observed that the value of many banking portfolios was declining. Gráda and White (2003) ﬁnd
that gender played a diﬀerent role in these bank run episodes. During the run in 1854, the share of
men and women who panicked was similar, but in 1857 women panicked more than men. Iyer et al.
(2016) study two runs on rural banks in India that occurred in 2001 and 2009. The authors ﬁnd
evidence that some factors such as being uninsured, having loan linkages to the bank or the level
of education aﬀected depositors' willingness to run diﬀerently, depending on whether the bank run
was due to contagion or provoked by fundamental causes.
There is a growing body of experimental research that also explores the eﬀect of various indi-
vidual characteristics on the emergence of bank runs. Previous research (Trautmann and Vlahu,
2013; Kiss et al., 2016b, 2014b; Dijk, 2017; Shakina and Angerer, 2018) has studied, among others,
the eﬀect of gender, risk aversion, loss aversion, cognitive abilities or emotions on the willingness to
withdraw. These studies, however, remain silent on the eﬀect of individual traits on the formation
of the line.
We believe that our ﬁndings are relevant to policy as well. In our study, we consider a series
of factors that are endogenous (e.g., individual characteristics), while others are exogenous (e.g.,
the informational environment). Policymakers should try to assess how endogenous factors aﬀect
the willingness to run so as to design optimal policies that can prevent bank runs; e.g., deposit
insurance depending on the degree of risk aversion of depositors. As for the exogenous factors,
these can be more easily inﬂuenced by policy. Along these lines, policymakers should strive to
promote the informational environment leading to less runs. We show that beliefs of depositors are
important. We believe this can be aﬀected for instance by credible policies; e.g., a well-functioning
deposit insurance may make depositors believe that other depositors are not likely to withdraw.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model and the theoretical
predictions. Section 3 contains the experimental design and the procedures. In section 4 we present
the results. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Model and Predictions
We present our theoretical framework in section 2.1. In section 2.2, we derive theoretical predictions
on the eﬀect of the informational environments. We discuss the potential inﬂuence of individual
traits in section 2.3.
To study the eﬀect of the informational environment, we assume that depositors only diﬀer
in their liquidity needs (impatient vs patient) and investigate the eﬀect of the observability of
actions on their eﬀort choices. To do that, we rely on the three-depositor setting applied in our
experiment, which is the simplest one to study the coordination problem embedded in Diamond and
Dybvig (1983). We show that bank runs may occur as a coordination problem in the simultaneous
environment, that in turn can lead to non-zero eﬀorts to arrive early at the bank. In the sequential
environment, no withdrawal by a patient depositor is expected in the second stage, implying zero
eﬀorts in the ﬁrst stage of the game. In Appendix A, we present a detailed theoretical model that
generalizes these results.
2.1 The bank run game with line formation
We extend the bank run game in Kiss et al. (2014a) to incorporate a stage in which depositors can
make costly eﬀorts (in form of a bid) to obtain a position in the line. The sequence of events is
presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Sequence of events in the game
In our model, there are three depositors, each of them endowed with 60 ECUs. From this initial
endowment 40 ECUs are automatically deposited in a common bank at t = 0.7 The bank will invest
the total endowment (120 ECUs) in a risk-free project that yields a guaranteed positive net return
after t = 2. The bank, however, can liquidate any fraction of the investment at no cost before the
project is carried out.
7As a result, we disregard the pre-deposit game described by Peck and Shell (2003).
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Depositors learn their liquidity needs after depositing their endowment in the bank. In partic-
ular, one of the depositors is hit by a liquidity shock and is forced to withdraw her funds from the
bank. We follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty
about the liquidity demand; i.e., it is common knowledge that one of the three depositors will need
the money and will withdraw with certainty. We refer to this depositor as the impatient depositor,
whereas the depositors who can choose to keep their funds deposited or to withdraw are called
patient depositors.
When depositor learn their liquidity needs (patient or impatient), they bid (simultaneously) for
a position in the line at t = 1. We interpret the bid as the level of costly eﬀort to arrive early at the
bank. After the bidding, the position of the depositors is determined (the highest / second highest
/ lowest bidder getting the ﬁrst / second / third position in the line) and depositors choose between
withdrawing their funds from the bank or keeping them deposited. We hereafter refer to depositor
i as the one in position i={1,2,3}.
Payoﬀs depend on the position in the line and on the decisions of the other depositors at t = 2
(see Table 1). If a depositor decides to withdraw, she immediately receives 50 ECUs as long as
there is enough money in the bank to pay this amount (out of this amount, 40 ECUs correspond
to the initial endowment and 10 ECUs are obtained in the form of interest). In our experiment,
if depositor 1 or 2 withdraws, she deﬁnitely receives 50 ECUs. However, if depositor 3 decides
to withdraw after two withdrawals, she only receives 20 ECUs (because the ﬁrst two depositors
who withdrew received 50 ECUs, the bank has only 20 ECUs to pay depositor 3). Nonetheless, if
depositor 3 withdraws after less than two withdrawals, the bank pays her 50 ECUs.
Depositors who decide to keep their funds deposited are paid at t = 2 once the bank carries out
the project. The amount that depositors receive depends on the total number of depositors who
keep their money in the bank at t = 2. If only one depositor keeps her money deposited, she receives
30 ECUs. If two depositors do so, then their payoﬀ is 70 ECUs. Note that position in the line is
only relevant if there is a run (i.e., when a patient depositor withdraws), because then arriving late
(that is, in position 3) yields only 20 ECUs instead of 50 ECUs.
Before discussing our predictions, there are some aspects of our setting that are worth mention-
ing. First, we constrain the bid at t = 1 to be an integer number between 0 and 20, both included.
This assumption implies that depositors can only bid the part of their endowment that was not
deposited in the bank and imposes some form of rationality because depositors cannot have losses
in the experiment. Second, the amount not used for bidding adds to the ﬁnal payoﬀ of the depositor.
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Table 1: Payoﬀs of the bank run game depending on the position of depositors and their choices.
For example, if a patient depositor bids 15 and only the impatient depositor withdraws, then she
receives (20-15)+70=75 ECUs. Finally, a patient depositor in position 3 should always keep her
funds deposited. This is because keeping the funds deposited always entails higher payoﬀs to a pa-
tient depositor 3 than withdrawing for any possible history of decisions; i.e., after two withdrawals,
depositor 3 receives 30 ECUs if she keeps her funds deposited and 20 ECUs if she withdraws. If a
depositor keeps her money in the bank and only the impatient depositor withdraws, it is better to
keep the funds deposited and earn the highest payoﬀ (70 ECUs vs. 50 ECUs).
2.2 Predictions in the bank run game
We focus on the polar situations in which observation of decisions is either absent or complete,
corresponding to the simultaneous environment (previous decisions cannot be observed) or the
sequential environment (both keeping the money deposited and withdrawal are observable and
depositors decide sequentially according to their position in the line).
Simultaneous environment. In the simultaneous environment, in t = 2 depositors are playing
a minimal version of the coordination problem embedded in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We
attempted to make this setup as close to Diamond and Dybvig (1983) as possible, so depositors do
not know neither their position, nor the decisions of the other depositors when deciding whether
or not to withdraw. For any possible line, there are two equilibria in pure strategies, one where
both patient depositors keep their money in the bank (the eﬃcient equilibrium) and one where
both patient depositors withdraw (the bank run equilibrium). If patient depositors are expecting to
choose the eﬃcient outcome in t = 2 (in other words, a patient depositor expects the other patient
depositor to keep her funds deposited), there is no incentive to make a costly eﬀort to arrive early,
9
thus a bid of 0 is the optimal strategy in t = 1. If the bank run equilibrium is expected to be played
in t = 2 (that is, a patient depositor expects the other patient depositor to withdraw), a patient
depositor best responds by spending some amount of money in the bidding stage in t = 1 to get
earlier to the bank than one of the other depositors, so she will bid a positive amount. The patient
depositor submits the minimal amount that she considers necessary to arrive in position 1 or 2 at
the bank and receive 50 ECUs. The impatient depositor has no incentive to make costly eﬀorts
to arrive early at the bank if she expects no withdrawals or only one withdrawal from the patient
depositors. If she expects that both patient depositors withdraw, then the same line of reasoning
applies to her as to the patient depositor who expects the other patient depositor to withdraw.
Thus, in this case she will bid the conjectured minimum positive amount that allows her to arrive
early at the bank.
Hypothesis 1 (Simultaneous environment): In the simultaneous setup, the eﬀort to arrive
early at the bank (i.e., the bids) depend on the beliefs about the occurrence of bank runs. If a patient
depositor expects the other patient depositor to withdraw, then she will submit a positive bid to arrive
early (in position 1 or 2) at the bank. If the impatient depositor expects that both patient depositors
withdraw, then she will submit a positive bid to arrive early at the bank. If no bank run is expected,
then depositors should submit a zero bid.
Sequential environment. In the sequential environment, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium without bank runs in t = 2 (Kinateder and Kiss, 2014; Kiss et al., 2014a). This occurs
because any patient depositor who observes that somebody has chosen to keep her funds deposited
should do so as well in order to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium. By backward induction and
sequential rationality, any patient depositor who arrives ﬁrst at the bank will keep her money in
the bank to induce the other patient depositor to follow suit. As a consequence, any withdrawal in
position 1 that is observed should be attributed to the impatient depositor. Then, upon observing
a withdrawal a patient depositor should keep her money in the bank, expecting that the other
patient depositor in position 3 will do the same. This, in turn, implies that the observability of
previous decisions solves the coordination problem in t = 2, therefore there is no point to make
costly eﬀorts to arrive early at the bank; i.e., depositors should bid nothing in the bidding stage in
t = 1, regardless of their liquidity needs.
Hypothesis 2 (Sequential environment and bank runs due to coordination problems):
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In the sequential environment, bank runs do not occur due to coordination problem among depositors;
thus both patient and impatient depositors should make no eﬀort to arrive early at the bank and should
submit a zero bid.8
Although the sequential environment solves the coordination problem, Kiss et al. (2018) argue
that the observation of withdrawals distorts depositors' beliefs that a bank run is underway. More
concretely, they ﬁnd that patient depositors tend to attribute an observed withdrawal to the other
patient depositor instead of to the impatient one. As a result, depositors who observe a withdrawal
are likely to withdraw as well (see also Garratt and Keister, 2009; Schotter and Yorulmazer, 2009;
Kiss et al., 2014a). Kiss et al. (2018) refer to these bank runs that do not occur because of funda-
mental problems or a coordination problem as panic bank runs. These results suggest a diﬀerent
prediction than the previous one. If depositors believe that a panic bank run can take place in
t = 2, then patient depositors may make costly eﬀorts in t = 1 to arrive early at the bank.
Hypothesis 3 (Sequential environment and bank runs due to panic behavior): In
the sequential environment, patient depositors may submit positive bids in the ﬁrst stage of the game
to arrive early at the bank if they believe that there will be a panic bank run.
In principle, the reason for patient depositors to bid in the sequential environment when a panic
bank run is underway is twofold. On the one hand, patient depositors have incentives to make a
costly eﬀort to arrive early at the bank in order to keep the money deposited. This way, the other
patient depositor will observe her decision and this will facilitate the coordination on the eﬃcient
outcome (if the ﬁrst depositor who acts is the impatient one, the observation of withdrawal may
result in a bank run).9 A second possibility is to bid and withdraw. This is reasonable if the patient
depositor thinks that the other patient depositor will withdraw for sure, thus the patient depositor
receives a guaranteed payoﬀ of 50 ECUs, rather than 30 ECUs corresponding to keeping the funds
deposited alone. When assessing both options, the patient depositor should ﬁnd it optimal to keep
her funds deposited whenever she believes that the other patient depositor will be rational enough
and will choose the eﬃcient outcome upon observing that somebody has already kept her money in
the bank.
8We generalize the theoretical predictions of Hypothesis 1 and 2 in Appendix A.
9This idea is somewhat reminiscent of what Choi et al. (2011) call strategic commitment.
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2.3 Individual traits
The previous theory is silent about the magnitude of the bids, but it is natural to think that the
size of the bid is aﬀected by individual traits.
In the experimental literature on bank runs, there is no consensus on whether women make
diﬀerent choices than men; e.g., Kiss et al. (2014b) do not ﬁnd gender diﬀerences in the withdrawal
decisions, while Dijk (2017) reports that women are more likely to withdraw when fear is induced
to participants. On the contrary, the experimental evidence on bidding behavior seems to support
the hypothesis that men and women bid diﬀerently; e.g., Rutström (1998) ﬁnds that women exhibit
more variance in bidding choices than men do, and Casari et al. (2007) ﬁnd that women without
experience in auctions tend to bid higher. In our game, it is unclear if these result hold when
bidding for position in a bank run game, thus we test whether gender aﬀects bidding behavior in
our informational environments.
In our experiment, we elicit also elicit risk, loss and ambiguity aversion (see section 3.2 for
further details).10 The more a depositor dislikes uncertainty or loss, the more she is willing to pay
to avoid it. However, it may have diﬀerent eﬀects in the diﬀerent setups. In the simultaneous setup,
a way to secure a payoﬀ is to be in position 1 or 2 and withdraw, that leads to a sure 50 ECUs
instead of facing i) the uncertainty of the 70 / 30 ECUs, or ii) a potential loss if she receives only
30 ECUs. Hence, if we consider two depositors in the simultaneous environment, both of them
expecting that at least one of the patient depositors withdraws, we conjecture that the one who is
more averse to uncertainty or loss will bid more. In the sequential environment, a patient depositor
may want to bid high to be the ﬁrst to make the withdrawal decisions and then she may choose
to keep her funds deposited and hence induce the other patient depositor to do so as well, both of
them earning 70 ECUs.11 Thus, here the high bid to be the ﬁrst would lead to keeping the money
in the bank, in contrast to the simultaneous case. However, in both cases, the more averse is a
depositor to uncertainty or loss, the more she would bid, ceteris paribus.
We measure the rest of the variables (cognitive abilities, income, trust, or personality traits)
mainly in order to control for them in the analysis and to avoid confounds. In Appendix B, we
speculate brieﬂy on their potential eﬀect.
10In our sample risk and loss aversion are negatively and signiﬁcantly correlated, but none of them is correlated
with ambiguity aversion on the individual level.
11Such reasoning assumes that the participant believes that the other participants are rational enough to make the
optimal decisions.
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3 The experiment
3.1 Experimental design and procedures
We recruited a total of 312 subjects (156 for the simultaneous environment and 156 for the sequential
one) with no previous experience in coordination problems or experiments on ﬁnancial decisions.
We ran six sessions with 24 subjects each at the Laboratory for Theoretical and Experimental
Economics (LATEX) of Universidad de Alicante and four sessions with 42 subjects each at the
Laboratory for Research in Experimental and Behavioural Economics (LINEEX) of Universitat de
Valencia between October 2015 and February 2016.12
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Instructions
were read aloud and the bank run game was played twice. The ﬁrst time served as a trial so that
participants can get familiarized with the game and the software. No results were communicated
to the subjects after this trial, nor was there any related payment. The second play was relevant
for the ﬁnal payment (see Appendix C for the instructions).
We employed the strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011) in each of the two informational
environments, where subjects made two diﬀerent types of choices. The ﬁrst one concerned a ﬁrst-
price auction, in which subjects decided what amount of their endowment not deposited in the bank
(between 0 and 20 ECUs) to bid for a position in the line. Subjects knew that the ﬁrst / second
/ third depositor in the line would be the depositor who submitted the highest / second highest /
lowest bid. Subjects were asked to bid both as patient and impatient depositors, thus we can use
a within-subject approach to test for diﬀerences in the bidding behavior of patient and impatient
depositors.
After their bidding decision, participants were asked to decide what to do if they arrived at
the bank and had the possibility of withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. Recall that
impatient depositors are forced to withdraw, thus we were only interested in the decision of the
patient depositors. In the simultaneous environment, patient depositors made their choices without
any further information apart from knowing their own bids. In the sequential environment, they
were asked to make a choice in six diﬀerent situations:
 If she arrived ﬁrst to the bank and did not observe anything.
12For each treatment, we have 72 participants from Alicante and 84 from Valencia. Having detected no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences across locations, we pool the observations.
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 If she arrived second and observed that the ﬁrst depositor had kept her money deposited.
 If she arrived second and observed that the ﬁrst depositor had withdrawn.
 If she arrived third and observed that the ﬁrst depositor had kept her funds deposited and
the second depositor had withdrawn.
 If she arrived third and observed that the ﬁrst depositor had withdrawn and the second
depositor had kept her funds deposited.
 If she arrived third and observed that the ﬁrst and the second depositor had withdrawn.
After subjects made their choices in the bank run game, they ﬁlled out a questionnaire that
was used to collect additional information about a set of socio-economic variables (see section 3.2).
In some sessions, we elicited the subjects beliefs' about their position in the line and the decision
of other depositors (see section 3.3). To avoid any wealth eﬀect that may distort the behavior of
subjects in these subsequent phases, the formation of banks and the realization of payoﬀs in the
bank run game was postponed to the end of the experiment (see section 3.4).
3.2 Elicitation of individual traits
We collect information on individual traits using a questionnaire. Our questionnaire started with
the elicitation of age and gender. Then, we elicited risk attitudes using the bomb risk elicitation
task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin (2013). This requires that subjects decide how many boxes
to pick from a store, each box being numbered from 0 to 100. Subjects were told that a bomb would
be placed in one of the boxes at random, and they had to decide the number of boxes they want to
collect. They would receive 0.10 euros for each box, if the bomb was not among the chosen boxes,
and 0 if they had chosen the box with the bomb. Crosetto and Filippin (2016) show that this task is
appropriate to distinguish subjects according to their risk attitude; in fact, they provide a range for
the risk aversion parameter r ∈ (r0, r1) depending on the number of boxes that a subject collects,
assuming a CRRA utility function, u(k) = kr . We hereafter use the midpoint of this interval as the
risk aversion parameter for each of the subjects; i.e., our risk aversion parameter for each individual
is r = (r1 − r0)/2.
We estimated loss aversion following Gächter et al. (2007). Participants were presented 5 dif-
ferent lotteries. Each of them paid out 4 Euros if the result of tossing a coin turned up tails, while
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subjects would lose an amount between 1 and 5 Euros if the coin turned up heads. Subjects had to
indicate whether or not they would be willing to accept each of the lotteries (see Table 2).
Table 2: Elicitation of loss aversion
Accept Reject
L1. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose e1; if the coin turns up tails, you win e4 ◦ ◦
L2. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose e2; if the coin turns up tails, you win e4 ◦ ◦
L3. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose e3; if the coin turns up tails, you win e4 ◦ ◦
L4. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose e4; if the coin turns up tails, you win e4 ◦ ◦
L5. If the coin turns up heads, then you lose e5; if the coin turns up tails, you win e4 ◦ ◦
Note: The modal value was 5 in every single condition.
If we apply cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and assume that subjects
give the same probability weights to the 0.5-chance of gaining and losing Gächter et al. (2007), then
the coeﬃcient of loss aversion λ will be given by the ratio between the utility of the winning price
and the losing price, where λ = u(G/L)r under CRRA utility function. In our data, we obtain the
degree of risk aversion r from the BRET and deﬁne a loss averse agent as the one with λ > 1.
We followed Halevy (2007) to elicit ambiguity aversion. There were four urns, composed of a
diﬀerent quantity of coloured balls, and participants had to bet on the colour of the ball to be drawn
from the urn, earning 2 euros if they guessed correctly (0 euros otherwise). Urn 1 was composed of
5 red and 5 blue balls. Urn 2 had an unknown number of red and blue balls. Urn 3 contained some
number (between 0 and 10) of red balls, the rest of balls being blue; this number would be chosen
from a bag with 11 balls numbered from 0 to 10. Finally, urn 4 would be ﬁlled with 10 red and 0 blue
balls, or with 0 red and 10 blue balls depending on if a 0 or a 10 was selected from a bag with these
two numbers. After betting for a colour in each urn, participants had the opportunity of selling
their bet, asking for a minimal price (in cents) between 0 and 2 Euros. Then, the computer would
choose a random number between 0 and 200, and would pay it if the selling price was below. We
use the diﬀerences in the selling price between urn 1 and urn 2 as a measure of ambiguity aversion.
The next item in our questionnaire was the Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT) by Frederick (2005).
This test consists of three questions that have an intuitive answer that is wrong; thus the test
measures the tendency to override the spontaneous response and to engage in further reﬂection
to give the correct answer to each question. We use the number of correct answers in the test
as a measure of cognitive abilities. Once subjects completed these questions, we asked them to
guess their number of correct answers and the number of questions answered correctly by another
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random participant. These questions were incentivized and are used in our experiment to measure
overconﬁdence (diﬀerence between the subject's guess of correct answers and the real number of
correct answers) and overplacement (diﬀerence between the subject's guess on their number of
correct answers and the number of correct answers by others).
Our questionnaire included other self-reported variables that were not incentivized. We asked
subjects their income level and their trust in several institutions (monarchy, government, army,
banks, police, church and political parties). We were especially interested in the trust in banks so
that we can control for the fact that some individuals may not trust banks and this may aﬀect their
propensity to run and withdraw their funds. These questions were taken from a questionnaire of
the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE). We also elicited personality traits using a 48-item
Big Five test. Finally we measured Social Value Orientation of our participants with the 9-Item
Triple-Dominance Measure (Van Lange et al., 1997).
3.3 Elicitation of beliefs
When subjects completed the questionnaire in our experimental sessions in Valencia (N = 84
subjects), we elicited their beliefs both regarding position in the line and decisions of the other
depositors. More concretely, we asked in both informational environments (simultaneous and se-
quential) and for both roles (impatient and patient depositor) what position they believed to obtain
when they submitted their bids.13
We also elicited subjects' beliefs regarding the occurrence of bank runs in each of the informa-
tional environments. To do so, we asked impatient depositors their belief regarding the behavior of
the patient depositors. More speciﬁcally, we asked when in the role of the impatient depositor what
the subjects believed about how many of the other depositors (0, 1 or 2) chose to withdraw. In the
simultaneous environment, we also asked this question when in the role of the patient depositor.
Since the impatient depositor was forced to withdraw, the possible answers were restricted to 1
and 2. Finally, in the sequential environment when in the role of patient depositor we asked the
belief upon observing a withdrawal in position 2. More concretely, subjects had to decide which of
the following three alternatives was most likely: 1) Depositor 1 who withdrew was the impatient
depositor (forced to withdraw), 2) Depositor 1 who withdrew was the one who could choose between
keeping the money deposited and withdrawal, or 3) The two previous options are equally likely. This
13In principle, subjects could bid without thinking about the position in the line. At the end of the experiment,
only 5% of the subjects reported that they did not think about their position when submitting their bids.
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is to assess whether participants attribute an observed withdrawal to the impatient depositor (as
predicted by rationality and the coordination explanation of bank runs) or to the patient depositor
(as suggested by panic bank runs).
3.4 Payment to participants
Once the experiment ﬁnished, the computer paired participants randomly to form banks of three
depositors and assigned the role of patient and impatient depositors at random. Payoﬀs were
computed according to the bidding behavior and the withdrawal decisions of subjects in the bank
run game (given their role).
Subjects were also paid for their choices in the questionnaire. In particular, we selected at
random one of the three tasks that were used to elicit risk attitudes, loss aversion and ambiguity.
We also paid subjects if they guessed correctly their performance in the CRT or if they guessed
correctly the number of questions answered correctly by another random participant. At the end of
the experiment, the ECUs earned during the experiment were converted into Euros at the rate 10
ECUs = 1 Euro. The experiment lasted approximately 1 h. The average earnings were 10.5 Euros.
4 Experimental results
We start with some descriptive statistics and statistical tests on the bidding behavior of depositors in
section 4.1. This includes an econometric analysis that controls for the variables in our questionnaire
to assess whether personal traits aﬀect the decision on when to go to the bank. In section 4.2, we
look at the depositors' decisions in the bank run game to show how withdrawal rates depend on
their beliefs about the occurrence of bank runs in both environments.
4.1 Behavior of depositors in the bidding stage
The upper panel of Table 3 reports the average bids and the frequency of positive bids for each type
of depositor (patient/impatient) in each possible environment (simultaneous/sequential), separately.
The lower panel of Table 3 summarizes the bids depending on the depositors' beliefs about their
position in the line.
We ﬁnd that depositors bid around 7.20 ECUs (roughly 36% of their endowment) regardless of
their role or the informational environment. Moreover, around 90% of the subjects bid a positive
amount to arrive early at the bank, without any distinguishable diﬀerence between the simultaneous
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TABLES 
 
Table. Summary of bids 
 
 Simultaneous Sequential 
 Patient Impatient Patient Impatient 
Average bid 7.25 (4.87) 7.53 (5.31) 7.15 (5.37) 6.96 (5.21) 
% Positive bid 0.88 0.93 0.88 0.88 
     
Believed position     
1 13.68 (4.41) 12.73 (4.44) 11.12 (6.11) 12.79 (5.12) 
2 8.83 (3.37) 7.97 (2.28) 8.03 (3.80) 7.09 (2.94) 
3 1.48 (1.66) 3.44 (4.32) 2.05 (4.68) 2.06 (2.88) 
 
 
 
Table. Beliefs of impatient depositors about the behavior of the patient depositors 
 Simultaneous Sequential 
   
None of the patient depositors will withdraw 36.90% 44.05% 
Only one of the patient depositors will withdraw 45.24% 50.00% 
Both of the patient depositors will withdraw 17.86% 5.95% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Gender  
 
 Simultaneous  Sequential  
 Patient Impatient Patient Impatient 
Males 7.82 (6.30) 8.26 (5.78) 7.84 (6.26) 7.96 (6.09) 
Females 7.33 (4.55) 6.58 (4.06) 6.75 (4.78) 6.38 (4.56) 
Table 3: Average bid (std. dev.), unconditional and conditional on the depositors' belief about their
position
and the sequential setup. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the bid of the patient and
impatient depositor in any of the two informational environments (p > 0.26 in each case), nor
is there any signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the bid of the patient and impatient depositor across
informational envir nments (p >0.35 in each case).14 These ﬁndings suggest that neither the type,
nor the informational environment aﬀects the bids.
At the bottom panel we observe that depositors who believe that they will arrive ﬁrst to the
bank tend to bid more on average than depositors who believe they will arrive second or third.
There is indeed a signiﬁcant correlation between the depositors' bid and their expected position
in the line (p-value < 0.0001). The correlation between bids and expected position suggests that
participants understood the underlying situation and those who wanted to achieve a better position
indeed submitted higher bids.
Finding 1: Both patient and impatient depositors bid, on average, a positive amount in the
simultaneous and the sequential environment. Depositors of diﬀ rent liquidity type do not bid dif-
ferently in any of the informational environments, and the bids of patient and impatient depositors
are undistinguishable across informational environments. Bids and expected positions correlate sig-
niﬁcantly; i.e., those depositors who believe that they arrive earlier at the bank, bid more.
Our theory predicts that depositors will run in the simultaneous environment only if they expect
14Unless otherwise noted, the reported p-values refer to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within-subject compar-
isons and the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test for the comparison across treatments. We rely on a one-tailed analysis
whenever there is a clear ex-ante hypothesis on the depositors' behavior.
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a bank run. This, in turn, implies that the impatient depositor should bid more when she expects
the two patient depositors to withdraw. Similarly, a patient depositor should bid more if she expects
that the other patient depositor will withdraw. Our data, however, reject this hypothesis. We do
not ﬁnd diﬀerences in the bids of patient depositors depending on if they expect a bank run to occur
or not (p = 0.97).15 Similarly, impatient depositors do not bid diﬀerently depending on whether
they expect a bank run or not (p = 0.85).
Finding 2: Beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs do not inﬂuence depositors' decision to arrive
early at the bank in the simultaneous environment.
A second feature that we conjecture to aﬀect the decision to arrive early at the bank in the
simultaneous environment is the intention to withdraw. If a patient depositor plans to keep her
funds deposited (believing that there will be no bank run), then she has no incentives to arrive early
at the bank. However, if she wants to withdraw (anticipating a bank run), then she should make a
costly eﬀort in form of a positive bid.16 Maybe surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd any statistical diﬀerence
in the bids of those depositors who keep the funds deposited (7.54 ECUs) and those who withdraw
(7.42 ECUs) in the simultaneous environments (p = 0.97).
Finding 3: The withdrawal decision does not inﬂuence the depositors' decisions to arrive early
at the bank in the simultaneous environment.
If bank runs occur because of a coordination problem among depositors, the ﬁnding that de-
positors do not bid diﬀerently in the simultaneous and the sequential environment is surprising.
Theoretically, the observability of actions should play a major role in determining depositors' bids
as it should solve the coordination problem in the sequential environment; in fact, the optimal deci-
sion is to bid nothing in the sequential environment. Depositors might bid positive amounts in the
sequential environment because they do not anticipate that there will be no bank run in equilibrium;
i.e., depositors may believe that the observability of actions will not foster coordination on the eﬃ-
cient equilibrium with no bank runs. We asked impatient depositors to predict how many patient
depositors will withdraw their money from the bank in each of the informational environments. Our
results are summarized in Table 4.
15As we show in section 4.2 beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs aﬀect the withdrawal decisions; e.g., patient
depositors withdraw more frequently if they expect a bank run compared to when they do not (0.5 vs 0.09).
16In fact, any patient depositor who keeps her funds deposited should believe that there will be no bank run, hence
the other patient depositor will do so as well. Thus, patient depositors should withdraw more frequently when they
expect a bank run. This is conﬁrmed by our data (see section 4.2).
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Table 4: Beliefs about the behavior of the patient depositors in each environment
Simultaneous Sequential
None of the patient depositors will withdraw 36.90% 44.05%
Only one of the patient depositors will withdraw 44.24% 50.00%
Both of the patient depositors will withdraw 17.86% 5.95%
We ﬁnd that roughly 37% (44%) of depositors expect to see no withdrawals in the simultaneous
(sequential) environment, while 18% (6%) of depositors expect that both patient depositors will
withdraw in the simultaneous (sequential) environment, respectively. The Kruskal-Wallis equality-
of-populations rank test rejects the null hypothesis that depositors expect the same behavior in
the two environments (p = 0.049). The test of proportion highlights that depositors expect to
see more coordination on the bank run equilibrium (i.e., both patient depositors withdraw) in the
simultaneous environment (p < 0.01). As a result, depositors seem to recognize the importance of
observability and expect coordination to be more successful in the sequential than in the simulta-
neous environment. However, the diﬀerences are not substantial and do not aﬀect the bids in a
signiﬁcant manner.
Finding 4: Depositors believe that bank runs will be less likely in the sequential than in the
simultaneous environment.
We have two plausible explanations related to rationality that may explain at least partly why
depositors run in the sequential environment, even though they seem to recognize that the observ-
ability of actions can beneﬁt coordination on the eﬃcient equilibrium. First, common knowledge
of rationality should lead subjects to understand that it is optimal to bid nothing and then to
keep the money in the bank if decisions are observable. However, subjects may not be rational. A
very natural way to measure rationality in our sequential environment is to recall that depositor
3 has a dominant strategy and should keep the funds deposited if patient. While the majority of
the subjects (129 out of 156, 83%) are rational according to this criterion and keep their money
in the bank in position 3, we ﬁnd that 27 out of the 156 subjects (17%) decided to withdraw (at
least once) in the last position. Our data conﬁrm that these irrational subjects make more costly
eﬀorts than rational subjects to arrive early at the bank (8.81 vs 6.80, p = 0.029), which indicates
that the high bids observed in the sequential environment may be partly due to the irrationality of
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some depositors. In the sequential environment, we can also identify as irrational depositors those
who withdraw in position 2 after observing that somebody kept her funds deposited. If we include
them in the deﬁnition of rationality, 122 out of 156 (78%) are rational depositors, and the rest
(22%) are irrational depositors. Our previous result that irrational depositors bid more than ratio-
nal depositors in the sequential environment is robust under this classiﬁcation (8.91 ECUs vs 6.66
ECUs, p = 0.013). In order to compare decisions of rational depositors between the simultaneous
and the sequential enviroment, a possible way to identify irrational depositors in the simultaneous
environment is to look at those depositors who believe to be in position 3 and still withdraw their
funds (3 out of 156 subjects, 2%). If we focus on the bidding behavior of rational subjects in the
simultaneous and the sequential environment, we ﬁnd that bids by rational depositors are higher
in the simultaneous environment. The diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant for patient depositors
(7.61 ECUs vs 6.66 ECUs, p = 0.046) but not for impatient depositors (7.23 ECUs vs 6.68 ECUs,
p = 0.26). This seems to support the idea that the high bids in the sequential environment are
partially explained because of the behavior of irrational depositors.
Finding 5: Irrational depositors bid more than rational depositors to arrive early at the bank
in the sequential environment.
A second mechanism that we believe to be of great importance in the sequential environment
is the possibility of panic bank runs. Subjects might be perfectly rational but believe that the
observation of withdrawals will induce additional withdrawals. This will lead to a bank run if
the impatient depositor decides ﬁrst and a patient depositor observes the withdrawal. A way to
counteract such behavior is to bid high in order to be the ﬁrst in the sequence of decisions and then
to keep the funds deposited so as to induce the other patient depositor to do so as well, assuming
that the other patient depositor will choose her best response upon observing that another depositor
chose to keep her money in the bank. In our data, subjects who decided to keep the money in the
bank in position 1 bid higher than those who decided to withdraw in position 1 (7.54 vs 5.73,
p = 0.045). This, in turn, provides evidence that patient depositors run to keep the funds deposited
and induce the other patient depositor to coordinate on the eﬃcient outcome with no bank runs.17
We summarize these results as follows:
Finding 6: Reaction to panic bank runs and beliefs about the irrational behavior of others urge
17See Masiliunas (2017) or Kinateder et al. (2015) for related evidence that subjects are willing to pay to reveal
their types and facilitate coordination on the eﬃcient equilibrium.
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some patient depositors to arrive early at the bank. These depositors keep their funds deposited to
induce other patient depositors to follow suit.
Up to this point, we have shown that bids do not diﬀer neither across liquidity types, nor across
informational environments (Finding 1). We have documented that neither beliefs about bank runs
(Finding 2), nor withdrawal decisions (Finding 3) aﬀect the costly eﬀort made to arrive early at
the bank in the simultaneous setup. Depositors believe that bank runs will be less likely in the
sequential than in the simultaneous environment (Finding 4). The irrational behavior of depositors
and their desire to achieve the eﬃcient outcome may explain why depositors rush in the sequential
setup (Findings 5 and 6).
As argued before, depositors may display a large degree of heterogeneity. In what follows, we
use econometric analysis to see if the previous ﬁndings hold when controlling for a wide range of
variables and the analysis also allows us to assess the importance of the individual characteristics
on the decision to run early to the bank.18 Table 5 reports the results of a Tobit regression on the
amount that depositors bid in the simultaneous environment, depending on their roles as patient
or impatient depositors. Table 6 replicates the analysis for the sequential environment. In each
case, our ﬁrst regression controls for risk preferences, loss and ambiguity aversion. We include the
demographic variables (Age and Gender) in our second regression. Our third regression controls for
income, trust in institutions (especially in banks) and cognitive abilities, while the fourth regression
also includes personality traits (Big Five and Social Value Orientation). In our analysis for patient
depositors, we consider a dummy variable (Decision) that takes the value 1 when they withdraw
their funds from the bank. In the sequential environment this variable indicates whether patient
depositors are interested in inducing other patient depositors to wait. To control for the possibility
of irrational subjects in the sequential environment, we also include a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 for subjects who withdraw in position 3.19
18For simple correlations between bidding behavior and individual traits see Appendix D.
19Our results are robust if we include as irrational subjects also those patient depositors who withdraw upon
observing that somebody kept her funds deposited. We note that our regressions do not control for the beliefs
of depositors regarding the occurrence of bank runs. This is because such beliefs are highly correlated with the
withdrawal decision of depositors, even though they do not aﬀect the bidding decision.
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Table 5: Bidding behavior in the simultaneous environment
Patient depositor allowed to keep the
money in the bank or withdraw
Impatient depositor forced to
withdraw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 8.162*** 4.583 5.721* 13.68* 8.316*** 11.63*** 12.34*** 9.854*
(1.4) (3.552) (3.06) (7.914) (1.448) (2.72) (3.584) (5.862)
Decision -0.098 -0.263 -0.402 0.078
(1.238) (1.217) (1.198) (1.972)
Risk aversion 1.058 0.97 1.273 1.164 0.99 0.984 0.925 0.903
(1.576) (1.484) (1.497) (1.622) (1.008) (1.014) (1.078) (1.2)
Loss aversion -2.086** -2.189*** -2.637*** -3.127** -2.572** -2.115* -2.182** -2.447*
(0.814) (0.819) (0.951) (1.227) (1.283) (1.075) (1.093) (1.375)
Ambiguity aversion 0.021** 0.020** 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01) (0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.006)
Age 0.166 0.146* 0.168 -0.124* -0.140** -0.137**
(0.102) (0.081) (0.114) (0.064) (0.058) (0.066)
Gender (=1 if female) 0.184 -0.354 0.509 -1.585 -1.632 -1.438
(1.008) (1.142) (0.89) (1.228) (1.444) (1.315)
Controls (income, conﬁdence, CRT) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personality (BIG5 and SVO) No Yes No Yes
Notes. We have a total of 131 observations in the simultaneous setting (10 left-censored, 117 uncensored, and 4 right-censored observations). In
the sequential setting, we have 144 observations (19 left-censored, 118 uncensored, and 7 right-censored observations). Robust standard errors in
parentheses are clustered at the session level. Signiﬁcance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Consider ﬁrst the simultaneous environment in Table 5. When depositors are in the role of
patient depositors, bids are not driven by whether or not subjects want to withdraw their money from
the bank as the variable Decision (=1 if withdrawal) is not signiﬁcant in any of the speciﬁcations,
conﬁrming Finding 3. Loss aversion seems to be a determinant of their bids. Although this eﬀect was
expected, the negative sign of loss aversion indicates that loss-averse subjects tend to bid less than
those who are not loss-averse. One possible reason to reconcile this ﬁnding is that subjects perceive
that bidding in the simultaneous environment (where they cannot make visible their decision to
subsequent participants) will not help to foster coordination, thus loss-averse subjects prefer to
keep their initial endowment of 20 ECUs rather than bidding to decide when to go to the bank.20
20We also ﬁnd an eﬀect of ambiguity aversion on bidding behavior, but the eﬀect vanishes when we include additional
controls; e.g., overconﬁdence, cognitive reﬂection, or personality traits. Among them, the only one that is signiﬁcant
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Hence, loss-averse subjects possibly view as a loss to submit a bid and therefore they bid less. When
we consider the decision of impatient depositors (who are forced to withdraw) we conﬁrm that loss
aversion has a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the bidding behavior. The eﬀect of loss aversion for
patient and impatient depositor is not statistically diﬀerent. Our personality measures (Big Five
and Social Value Orientation) are not signiﬁcantly associated with the bid neither for the patient,
nor for the impatient depositor.
Finding 7: In the simultaneous environment, loss aversion plays a role in the bidding decision
of depositors. In particular, we ﬁnd that loss averse depositors are less likely to arrive early at the
bank.
Next, we look at the bidding behavior in the sequential environment in Table 6. If bank runs
are due to coordination problems, subjects should bid nothing in this environment. However, we
observe positive bids (and these bids are not statistically diﬀerent from the ones in the simultaneous
environment, except when we exclude irrational subjects, as indicated in our Findings 1 and 5). In
line with our previous discussion, our econometric analysis lends support to Finding 5, since subjects
who withdraw in position 1 tend to bid signiﬁcantly less than those who keep their money in the
bank; i.e., the patient depositor tends to arrive early at the bank to keep her funds deposited and
induce the other patient depositor to act in the same way. There is also a signiﬁcant eﬀect of
rationality in that those who are irrational tend to bid more, again conﬁrming Finding 5.21 Finally,
we ﬁnd that loss-averse subjects in the role of patient depositors tend to bid more than subjects
who are not classiﬁed as loss-averse. This is in line with the idea that subjects in the sequential
environment want to avoid a bank run and prefer to bid to show their choice to other depositors.
Seemingly, in the sequential setup subjects see it as a loss if they fail to coordinate on the eﬃcient
outcome and a way to avoid this failure is to actively promote coordination. In fact, a loss-averse
depositor is more likely to keep her funds deposited in position 1 than a depositor who is not loss-
averse (31.2% vs. 21.1%). Our ﬁndings for impatient depositors suggest that loss aversion has no
eﬀect when depositors are forced to withdraw in the sequential environment. Again, the personality
traits show no signiﬁcant association with the bid.
is cognitive ability; subjects with higher score in the Cognitive Reﬂection Test tend to bid less (p = 0.047). For the
eﬀect of cognitive reﬂection on ﬁnancial decisions see Korniotis and Kumar (2010).
21The diﬀerences in the withdrawal rates of rational (21.70%) and irrational (22.22%) subjects is not statistically
signiﬁcant (p = 0.953), thus we can conclude that irrational subjects do not tend to bid more because they are more
likely to withdraw in position 1.
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Table 6: Bidding behavior in the sequential environment
Patient depositor allowed to keep the
money in the bank or withdraw
Impatient depositor forced to
withdraw
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant 7.969*** 5.799*** 6.171*** 8.687* 7.286*** 4.788* 3.266 8.402**
(1.084) (1.542) (1.692) (4.513) (1.759) (2.633) (2.7) (3.959)
Decision (=1 if withdraw) -2.035* -1.814 -2.023** -2.020*
(1.12) (1.097) (1.007) (1.183)
Irrational subjects 3.621*** 3.375*** 3.313*** 3.744*** 2.200* 1.789 2.290* 2.124
(1.101) (1.112) (1.035) (0.934) (1.12) (1.125) (1.236) (1.325)
Risk aversion -0.25 -0.546 -0.432 -0.497 -0.59 -1.069* -0.772* -0.435
(1.118) (1.083) (1.196) (1.249) (0.683) (0.613) (0.464) (0.644)
Loss aversion 2.558*** 2.663*** 2.803*** 2.899*** 1.507 1.603 1.746 1.747
(0.746) (0.905) (0.897) (0.905) (1.46) (1.342) (1.445) (1.362)
Ambiguity aversion -0.009 -0.01 -0.012 -0.009 -0.015*** -0.017** -0.013* -0.0148
(0.011) (0.013) (0.012) (0.01) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
Age 0.118* 0.120** 0.126* 0.161** 0.139** 0.137*
(0.063) (0.058) (0.071) (0.066) (0.067) (0.0786)
Gender (=1 if female) -0.985 -0.858 -0.862 -1.909*** -0.862* -0.867
(1.057) (0.713) (0.565) (0.622) (0.464) (0.732)
Controls (income, conﬁdence, CRT) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personality (BIG5 and SVO) No Yes No Yes
Notes. We have a total of 131 observations in the simultaneous setting (10 left-censored, 117 uncensored, and 4 right-censored obser-
vations). In the sequential setting, we have 144 observations (19 left-censored, 118 uncensored, and 7 right-censored observations).
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the session level. Signiﬁcance at the *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Finding 8: In the sequential environment, loss aversion plays a role in the bidding decision of
patient depositors. In particular, loss-averse depositors bid more in order to arrive earlier at the
bank.
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4.2 Behavior of depositors in the bank run game
For the sake of completeness, we report in Table 7 the withdrawal rates of patient depositors in the
simultaneous and the sequential environment.22 In this section, we also discuss the importance of
beliefs and rationality on the depositors' behaviour.
Table. Withdrawal rates of patient depositors 
 
 Withdrawal rate 
  
Simultaneous environment 15.4% 
        Depositor expects a bank run 50% 
        Depositor expects no bank run 9% 
  
Sequential environment  
        Depositor 1 (Obs. nothing) 21.8% 
        Depositor 2 (Obs. withdrawal) 57.7% 
        Depositor 2 (Obs. waiting) 5.1% 
        Depositor 3 (Obs. a waiting and a withdrawal) 8.6% 
        Depositor 3 (Obs. two withdrawals) 9% 
  
 
 
 
Appendix 
 
Gender  
 
 Simultaneous  Sequential  
 Patient Impatient Patient Impatient 
Males 7.82 (6.30) 8.26 (5.78) 7.84 (6.26) 7.96 (6.09) 
Females 7.33 (4.55) 6.58 (4.06) 6.75 (4.78) 6.38 (4.56) 
 7.25 (4.87) 7.526 (5.31) 7.147 (5.37) 6.961 (5.21) 
     
Wilcoxon test (Z) 0.28 (0.78) 1.79 (0.07) 0.94 (0.35) 1.49 (0.14) 
Variance-comparison test 
(t) 
1.91 (0.005) 2.02 (0.002) 1.71 (0.019) 1.78 (0.013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 Bids  Withdrawal Bids 
Table 7: Withdrawal rates of patient depositors in each informational environment.
We obs rve in Table 7 that the withdrawal rate is slightly over 15% in the simultaneous envi-
ronment. Theoretically, beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs are the key variable to explain the
behavior of patient depositors in this environment. Empirically, we ﬁnd support for this prediction;
e.g., the test of proportion suggests that patient depositors are more likely to withdraw when they
expect a bank run compared with the case in which they do not expect a bank run (50% vs 9%,
p = 0.003).23
Finding 9: Beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs aﬀect the withdrawal decisions of patient
22When observing that a depositor kept her funds in the bank and another one withdrew, we asked subjects what
they would do if depositor 1 kept the money in the bank and depositor 2 withdrew and the other way around. In
line with the theoretical prediction, depositor 3 does not react diﬀerently to this information (9% vs. 8.3%, p =
0.808), thus we pool the results ("Obs. that a depositor kept her funds in the bank and another one withdrew"). In
addition, we note that most of the subjects are rational in that the withdrawal rate of depositor 3 is rather low (less
than 10%).
23The likelihood of withdrawal in the simultaneous environment does not seem depend on the depositor's belief
regarding her position in the line, according to the Kruskal-Wallis test (p = 0.89). These ﬁndings are robust to an
econometric approach.
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depositors in the simultaneous environment in the expected way.
The sequential environment allows depositors to observe what other depositors have decided.
Theoretically, this should facilitate coordination in that i) any patient depositor should keep her
funds deposited, regardless of what she observes, and ii) any withdrawal from depositor 1 should be
assigned to the impatient depositor. Although we expect no bank runs due to coordination problems
because of these reasons, we ﬁnd that panic bank runs emerge when choices are observable, as
reported in Kiss et al. (2018). Hence, the test of proportion suggests that depositor 2 is more likely
to withdraw upon observing a withdrawal than observing that a depositor kept her money in the
bank (57.7% vs. 5.1%, p < 0.001). In addition, depositors believe that withdrawals from depositor
1 are not always due to the impatient depositor; e.g., 66% of depositors believe that the withdrawal
was due to the patient depositor or any of the two depositors (the patient and the impatient) with
the same probability. When depositor 2 observes a withdrawal, she tends to withdraw regardless
of whether she believes that the observed withdrawal was due to the patient or the impatient
depositor (p = 0.29) which suggests that the observation of the withdrawal distorts the beliefs that
a bank run is underway and provokes panic behavior (see Kiss et al., 2018, for further discussion
on this topic). Beliefs on the rationality of others are also important to withdrawal decisions in the
sequential environment. When depositor 1 believes that there will be more than one withdrawal,
she withdraws more frequently than when she expects only one withdrawal (the one of the impatient
depositor) (34.4% vs. 16.2%, p < 0.032)
Overall, our ﬁndings highlight that beliefs on the occurrence of bank runs aﬀect withdrawal
decisions in the simultaneous and the sequential environment. In the former setting, depositors
tend to withdraw when they expect a bank run, even though their intention to withdraw does not
aﬀect their willingness to arrive early at the bank. In the sequential environment, depositors should
keep their funds deposit regardless of what they observe, and this should prevent them from rushing
early to the bank. Arguably, we ﬁnd that depositors believe that panic bank runs may occur in the
sequential environment. Depositors react to these beliefs by making costly eﬀort to arrive early at
the bank.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This study was motivated by the paucity of theoretical and empirical evidence regarding how lines
of depositors form in front of banks. Theoretically, researchers generally assume that lines form
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randomly, reﬂecting their lack of knowledge about who rushes to the banks. Empirically, it is hard
to address this question. Even if we observe the line, we ignore the liquidity needs of the depositors
and the information they use when choosing if to withdraw or not. Covering this gap, to our best
knowledge we are the ﬁrst to study the formation of the line.
To achieve our objective, we build a theoretical model that yields useful predictions about the
formation of lines, depending on the informational environment. A basic assumption behind the
model is that the willingness to pay for position in the line in the form of a bid is a good proxy
for the costly eﬀort that an individual would make to arrive early at the bank. Theory predicts
that when decisions of withdrawing or keeping the money deposited are observable, then we should
not observe any bank runs for any line that may arise and as a consequence no eﬀort is needed to
achieve the ﬁrst best. In contrast, when these decisions cannot be observed, then beliefs about the
decision of other depositors determine both the bids and also the subsequent decisions.
We designed an experiment to investigate both the eﬀect of the informational environment and
liquidity type. We also posit some conjectures about how individual characteristics may aﬀect
our theoretical predictions. Interestingly, the descriptive statistics show no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the bids (and hence in our interpretation the eﬀorts to arrive early at the bank) neither
across liquidity types (patient vs. impatient), nor across informational environments (simultaneous
vs. sequential). Beliefs reveal that participants expected less bank runs in the sequential setup,
but they did not believe that no coordination failure would arise there. We observe that both
irrational behavior and the desire to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium play a role. More
precisely, some participants were not fully rational (as they did not recognize dominant strategies in
some information sets) and irrationality led to higher bids, ceteris paribus. Moreover, we document
that some participants in the role of the patient depositor seemed to bid high to be the ﬁrst in the
sequence of decision to keep her funds deposited, thus inducing the other patient depositor to do
the same (and prevent a panic bank run). Possibly, this wish to coordinate with other depositors by
making visible the decision to keep the funds deposited could be harnessed by banks or regulators.
When considering a wide range of individual traits, we ﬁnd that among the uncertainty mea-
sures, loss aversion seems to play an important role even if we control for the personality traits
captured by the Big Five and the Social Value Orientation (that in turn do not aﬀect bids). In the
simultaneous setup loss-averse subjects seem to perceive money spent on the bid as a loss, so they
submit signiﬁcantly lower bids. However, in the sequential setup loss-averse subjects in the role of
patient depositors submit signiﬁcantly higher bids, ceteris paribus. This is in line with the desire
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to coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium. Possibly, subjects as patient depositors in this setup
perceive as a loss if they fail to achieve the highest payoﬀ related to the no-bank-run outcome, and
are willing to make costly eﬀort to obtain those payoﬀs. Note also that in the sequential setup loss
aversion does not inﬂuence the bids submitted by the impatient depositor.
Even though we do not ﬁnd that the informational environment aﬀects bids and only document
some evidence that individual characteristics inﬂuence who runs ﬁrst to the bank, this seeming
non-result is a contribution to the literature in our view. On the theoretical front, our results
suggest that the assumption that lines form randomly in front of banks is not wrong, at least it
does not contradict our ﬁndings. Furthermore, theorists should consider using utility functions that
captures loss aversion. Regarding policy recommendation, our ﬁndings indicate that information
about other depositors decisions does not aﬀect how lines form in front of banks and among a
battery of personality traits and preferences only loss aversion seems to play some role. However,
in line with the existing literature we document that beliefs aﬀect withdrawal decisions, that is the
action that depositors undertake once the line is formed. The policy governing ﬁnancial stability
has an important role in aﬀecting these beliefs, because if depositors believe that others will not
withdraw their funds, then they will not withdraw either. For instance, a credible deposit insurance
scheme may prevent ineﬃcient bank runs even if decisions of other depositors is not observable.
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Appendix A: Theoretical prediction - The role of observability of
withdrawal decisions
We modify the workhorse model in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by adding a bidding stage before
the withdrawal decision of depositors. We also allow for the observability of actions in the sequential
environment.
A.1 Depositors
There are three time periods denoted by t = 0, 1, 2. Period 1 is divided into subperiods as will be
detailed later. There is a ﬁnite set of depositors denoted by I = {1, ..., N}, where N > 2. The
consumption of depositor i ∈ I in period t = 1, 2 is denoted by ct,i ∈ R0+, and her liquidity type by
θi. It is a binomial random variable with support given by the set of liquidity types Θ = {0, 1}. If
θi = 0, depositor i is called patient, that is, she only cares about consumption at t = 1. If θi = 0,
depositor i is called patient. Depositor i's utility function is given by
ui(c1,i, c2,i, θi) = ui(c1,i + (1− θi)c2,i).
Similarly to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), we assume that depositors are suﬃciently risk-averse
and the Inada-conditions are met. The number of patient depositors is assumed to be constant and
given by p ∈ {1, ..., N} and the remaining depositors are impatient. The number of patient and
impatient depositors is common knowledge. The liquidity type is private information.
A.2 The bank
At t = 0, each depositor i ∈ I has one unit of a homogeneous good which she deposits in the
bank. The bank oﬀers a simple demand deposit contract to the depositors that stipulates that
upon withdrawal in period 1 depositors receive c1 > 1 unless the funds available to pay that amount
decrease to very low levels or zero. We assume that an optimization exercise in the spirit of Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) determines c1. The ﬁrst best allocation solves
maxc1,c2(N − p)ui(c1,i) + pui(c2,i)
s. t. (N − p)c1 + pRc2 = N.
The solution to this problem is
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u′(c∗1) = Ru′(c∗2),
which, as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), implies that R > c∗2 > c∗1 > 1. In the ﬁrst best allocation,
all impatient depositors consume c∗1 at t = 1, and all patient ones c∗2 at t = 2. Hence, patient
depositors receive a higher consumption than impatient ones.
Let η ∈ {0, ..., p} be the number of depositors who keep their money deposited at t = 1.24
Following the Diamond-Dybvig model it is assumed that all players who keep their money in the
bank at t = 1, obtain the same consumption at t = 2, namely,
c2(η) = max{0, R(N−(N−η)c
∗
1)
η }.
If η = p, only impatient depositors withdraw at t = 1, and c2(η) = c∗2 > c∗1. Then, patient depositors
enjoy a higher consumption than impatient ones. Given p, N and c∗1, it is possible to determine how
many patient depositors have to keep their funds deposited in order for doing so to be an optimal
strategy for each of them. Second-period consumption is higher than consumption received after
withdrawing at t = 1 if the following holds
R(N − (N − η)c∗1)
η
> c∗1.
This condition is equivalent to
η >
RN(c∗1 − 1)
c∗1(R− 1)
.
Since η is a natural number so the previous condition becomes
η ≥ int
[
RN(c∗1 − 1)
c∗1(R− 1)
]
+ 1.
Given p, N and c∗1, there is a unique η¯ such that 1 ≤ η¯ ≤ p, and for every patient depositor i
who keeps her funds deposited receives c2(η) ≤ c∗1, for all η ≤ η¯, and c2(η) > c∗1, for all η > η¯.25
The bank is able to pay c∗1 to int
[
N
c∗1
]
depositors. After int
[
N
c∗1
]
withdrawals the bank has
possibly some funds left over (it is strictly less than c∗1) that it can pay to the next withdrawing
depositor. We denote this sum clow1 . All subsequent depositors who want to withdraw receive zero.
24Note that η is restricted to be equal to p or smaller since an impatient depositor has a dominant strategy to
withdraw, and thus, not more than p depositors keep their funds deposited.
25We use "wait" and "keep the money deposited / in the bank" in an interchangeable manner.
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A.3 Strategies and equilibrium
Period 1 is divided in two parts in which the two stages of the underlying game are played. In the ﬁrst
one, depositors submit a bid that determines their position in the sequence of decision. In the second
stage, depositors decide sequentially whether to wait or to withdraw their funds from the bank. We
assume that bids are not publicly observable. Regarding the information that depositors have in the
second stage, we consider two setups: i) simultaneous and ii) sequential. In the simultaneous setup
depositors know their position in the sequence, but actions of other depositors are not observed. In
the sequential setup, previous decisions are observed.
We assume that bids are bounded from above, so nobody can bid more than a certain amount
that we denote by bmax. For simplicity, we assume that every depositor has an endowment bmax
that can be used for bidding. We denote by bi ∈ [0, bmax] the amount submitted by depositor i
in the ﬁrst stage. The ranking of bids determines the sequence of decision, so for instance the
depositor who submitted the highest bid is the ﬁrst to decide in the second stage. If more than one
depositor submits the same bid, then each has the same probability of being the ﬁrst to act. Let
b = (b1, ..bi, ..bN ) be the vector of all bids. Function r(bi, b) : bi × b → [1, N ] ranks the bids and
determines the sequence. We denote by ri the position of depositor i.
The decision in the second stage is binary, si ∈ {0, 1} where 0 denotes keeping the money
deposited, while 1 represents withdrawal. Impatient depositors' decision in stage 2 is always to
withdraw (s = 1), but it depends on their bids when they get the chance to do so. The strategy
of a patient depositor i is (bi; si). Any depositor's ﬁnal payoﬀ is the consumption received from
the bank (which depends on whether the depositor withdraws and on the other depositors' choices)
plus the endowment for bidding minus the actual bid. To sum up, the ﬁnal payoﬀs are as follows:
c1,i =

c∗1 + (bmax − bi), if si = 1 and
ri−1∑
j=1
sj < int
[
N
c∗1
]
,
clow1 + (bmax − bi), if si = 1 and
ri−1∑
j=1
sj = int
[
N
c∗1
]
,
0 + (bmax − bi), if si = 1 and
ri−1∑
j=1
sj > int
[
N
c∗1
]
c2,i =
{
c2(η) + (bmax − bi), if si = 0
The ﬁrst row says that if the bank has enough funds (that is, the number of previous withdrawals
is suﬃciently low) and depositor i decides to withdraw, then she receives c∗1. However, if previous
withdrawals depleted the funds of the bank in such a way that it has less than c∗1, then the bank
pays whatever is left to the withdrawing depositor (clow1 in the second row). And if a depositor
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who attempts to withdraw comes too late, then she receives zero. For simplicity, we assume that
clow1 = 0. In the last line that describes second-period consumption for those who keep their funds
deposited, c2(η) is given by (5).
A.4 Equilibrium
We solve the game using backward induction. Thus, ﬁrst we determine how depositors decide in
the second stage given the available information. Then, we see how the optimal bids are in the
ﬁrst stage. In equilibrium, nobody would like to deviate unilaterally, that is given the bid and the
decision of others nobody would like to change her bid and decision.
A.4.1 Sequential setup
We begin with the second stage that is complicated since decisions can be based now also on what
is observed. Hence, a strategy for a patient depositor speciﬁes what the depositor should do at any
position and given any sequence of previous decisions that she might observe. Kinateder and Kiss
(2014) show in an equivalent setup that for any possible sequence of decisions patient depositors
do not withdraw. This result applies to our paper as well. Given the unique equilibrium in the
subgame played in the second stage no depositor has incentives to submit a positive bid.
Proposition 1: Given the payoﬀs, depositors submit zero bids in stage 1 and in stage 2 patient
depositors wait and impatient depositors withdraw.
A.4.2 Simultaneous setup
Again we start with the second stage. Since previous decisions cannot be observed, decisions can
be conditioned only on type (patient vs. impatient) and the belief about the other depositors'
decisions. Note that we do not impose that these beliefs cannot depend on position. The important
thing is what a patient depositor believes about the number of patient depositors (other than her)
who choose to wait. We denote the belief of depositor i by βi. Clearly, if βi ≥ η¯, then her optimal
decision is to wait also. Otherwise, the optimal decision given the payoﬀs is to withdraw.
BRi(βi) =
 1 if βi < η¯,0 otherwise
Theoretically, if there is a mechanism that coordinates beliefs of the depositors (as the sunspots
in Diamond and Dybvig (1983)), then there should be two equilibria for any given sequence of
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decision: either a full-ﬂedged bank run or an equilibrium in which no patient depositor withdraws.
Given these best responses, how should a depositor bid in the ﬁrst stage? If depositors are
rational and take into account the structure of the game, then their bidding depends on what they
expect to happen in stage 2. If any depositor (patient or impatient) believes that at most N − η¯
depositors withdraw, then there is no point in bidding any positive amount in order to be at the
beginning of the line. Otherwise, if a depositor believes that there will be a bank run in stage 2,
then it pays oﬀ to submit a positive bid if in expected terms it yields a higher utility than bidding
zero. That is,
Pr i(bi) ∗ ui(c∗1 + bmax − bi) + (1− Pr(bi))ui(0 + bmax − bi) > u(0),
where Pri(bi) is a function that maps bi into a subjective probability of being among the ﬁrst
int
[
N
c∗1
]
according to the bidden amount. Thus, Pri(x) = 0.8 means that individual i believes that
if she bids x, then with 80% probability she will be among the ﬁrst int
[
N
c∗1
]
depositors and receives
c∗1.
What is the optimal amount to bid if a depositor believes that there will be a run? It solves the
following optimization problem
max
bi
Pr i(bi)ui(c
∗
1 + bmax − bi) + (1− Pr i(bi))ui(0 + bmax − bi)
s.t.
Pr i(bi) ∗ ui(c∗1 + bmax − bi) + (1− Pr i(bi))ui(0 + bmax − bi) > u(0)
bi ≤ bmax
Notice that we deliberately denote the utility function as ui attempting to express that the
way depositors value the utility derived from consumption may vary from individual to individual
according to individual traits.
Unless we impose a speciﬁc functional form the utility we cannot solve the problem. It is not
important for us to derive an exact solution. We are satisﬁed with more general predictions that
rely on the beliefs of the depositors.
Proposition 2:
 If a patient depositor believes that the number of withdrawals in stage 2 of period 1 will be
less or equal to η¯, then she bids zero in stage 1. If a patient depositor believes that the number
of withdrawals in stage 2 of period 1 will be more than η¯, then she bids a positive amount up
to bmax.
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 If an impatient depositor believes that the number of withdrawals in stage 2 of period 1 will
be less or equal to int
[
N
c∗1
]
depositors, then she bids zero in stage 1. If an impatient depositor
believes that the number of withdrawals in stage 2 of period 1 will be more than int
[
N
c∗1
]
,
then she bids a positive amount up to bmax.
Proof. If a patient depositor expects the number of total withdrawals to be less than η¯, then she
expects the bank to have enough funds in period 2 so that her consumption will be larger than c∗1.
In this case, she does not want to waste resources on bidding. In the opposite case, it does not
pay oﬀ to wait until period 2, as the payoﬀ will be lower, than the payoﬀ in period 1 if she obtains
a suﬃciently good position in the line. The amount to bid depends on how many other patient
depositor she expects to withdraw. In the worst case, she may expect all other patient depositor to
withdraw also. In this case, she may bid a high amount, but never higher than bmax .
If an impatient depositor expects the number of total withdrawals to be less than or equal to
int
[
N
c∗1
]
, then she believes that by withdrawing she will receive c∗1, so there is no point in spending
resources on bidding. If she believes the number of withdrawals to be higher, then she bids what
she deems necessary to have a positive utility, her maximum bid being bmax.
Note that the previous proposition is not about equilibrium, but individual decisions. Clearly, if
many depositors hold pessimistic beliefs (that may be aﬀected by individual traits) about decisions
in stage 2, then a bank run occurs. In the opposite case, bank run may not occur. However, it is
possible that more depositors withdraw than the number of impatient depositors. Since there are
no coordination devices (as the sunspots in the original Diamond-Dybvig study), it is possible that
miscoordination happens. Beliefs govern what happens in this setup. In the experiment we control
for beliefs as we ask the participants what they think how many of the other depositors chose to
withdraw.
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Appendix B: Conjectures on the eﬀects of individual traits
In this Appendix we formulate some conjectures on the potential eﬀect of some variables that we
measure in the experiment on the bidding of the participants.
We start with cognitive abilities. In Kiss et al. (2016b) we investigated to some extent the eﬀect
of cognitive abilities (measured by the Cognitive Reﬂection Test) on decisions in some information
sets with dominant strategies in a bank run experiment. We found that individuals with better
cognitive abilities chose the dominant strategy more often in the presence of strategic uncertainty. In
general, we may expect individuals with better cognitive abilities to make better choices. Regarding
withdrawal decisions, it implies that in the sequential setup they would keep their funds deposited
if being the ﬁrst to decide or if observing that somebody has already kept her money in the bank.
In the simultaneous setup, beliefs determine what is the best response. Turning to bidding choices,
note that in the simultaneous setup it is a dominated strategy to bid high and then keep the funds
deposited. Hence, we expect a participant with a high CRT score either in the role of a patient or
impatient depositor to bid high and then to withdraw. Things are less clear in the sequential setup,
because participants as patient depositor may want to bid high to arrive early to the bank and then
by keeping their money deposited they could try to induce the other patient depositor to follow
suit. This signaling behavior has been observed by Kinateder et al. (2015). However, in the case
of the impatient depositor who lacks any incentive to show others that she does not withdraw we
expect that individuals with better cognitive abilities will bid low. Note that these conjectures are
often complex as they relate bidding and withdrawal decisions or are dependent on the information
environment and / or the liquidity type of the depositor.
We consider next the eﬀect of income and the trust in institutions. As seen in the literature
review, more wealthy individuals tend to be more sophisticated, so they usually make better deci-
sions. In this sense, the predictions for higher income correlate with those related to better cognitive
abilities. Trust in institutions and especially in banks implies that a participant who trusts insti-
tutions is less likely to withdraw in the second stage in both setups. Therefore, she is less worried
about arriving early at the bank, so she would bid lower, ceteris paribus.
To measure personality traits we use the Big Five. Openness to experience that reﬂects intel-
lectual curiosity and creativity a priori does not seem to be related to bidding behavior in our
experiment. Individuals are described by conscientiousness if - among others - they prefer planned
rather than spontaneous behavior. These planning may be related to bidding decisions that corre-
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spond to the theoretical predictions. Extraversion reﬂects energy, positive emotions, assertiveness
and sociability, traits that do not seem to imply a clear bidding behavior. Agreeableness expresses
the tendency to be compassionate and cooperative, and is also a measure of trusting and helpful
behavior. It may aﬀect the beliefs an individual has about the other patient depositor's decision.
The less agreeable a participant is, the more she may believe that there will be a bank run that
in turn implies higher bids in the simultaneous setup. Individuals exhibiting neuroticism tend to
experience unpleasant emotions (such as anger, anxiety and depression) easily. Related to bidding
behavior in our experiment, the more neurotic a participant is, the more she may want to avoid
having to be concerned about the other patient depositor's decision and may submit a higher bid.
Related to personality traits we also measured social preferences that were elicited using the
9-Item Triple-Dominance Measure of a Social Value Orientation (SVO) (see Van Lange et al., 1997)
that is widely used to measure such preferences in social psychology (see Murphy and Ackermann,
2011). More concretely, the test classiﬁes individuals as prosocial, individualistic or competitive if
she makes at least 6 choices that correspond to that category in 9 allocation tasks.26 Since receiving
the highest payoﬀ depends on the choice of the other patient depositor, so it requires coordination,
we expect that individuals classiﬁed as prosocial tend to attempt to achieve those payoﬀs by waiting
in the second stage. That in turn implies that in the simultaneous setup these individuals would
bid lower, ceteris paribus. In the sequential setup, their behavior is less clear as they may bid high
to be the ﬁrst to decide and then keep the money in the bank and induce the subsequent patient
depositor to do so as well. Following similar arguments, individualistic participants may tend to
care only for themselves and try to receive the sure payoﬀ related to withdrawal. Therefore, in both
treatments we expect them to bid high and withdraw, ceteris paribus.
26Note that an individual is not classiﬁed if her choices do not correspond consistently with one of the categories.
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Appendix C: Instructions
Here we reproduce the instructions, translated from Spanish.
Simultaneous treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
In this experiment, we study how individuals solve decision-making problems, and we are not
interested in your particular decision, but in the average behavior of individuals. That is why you
will be treated anonymously during the experiment and nobody in this room will ever know the
decisions that you make.
Next, you will see the instructions that explain how the experiment goes. These instructions are
the same for all participants and it is of utmost importance that you understand them well because
your earnings will depend to a large extent on your decisions.
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to complete a long questionnaire that contains
several games that allow you to earn extra money. The objective of the questionnaire is to get
to know your tastes and preferences (that are not obviously the same as those of the rest of the
participants) and for this reason there are no correct answers to the questions that we raise. During
the questionnaire it is important that you state your preferred option in each case because your
earnings from the questionnaire depend to a large degree of your decisions.
Remember that all the decisions that you make during the experiment are anonymous and will
not be linked to you. If you have any doubt or question during the experiment, raise your hand and
we will come to you. Remember also that you are not allowed to speak during the experiment.
What is the experiment about?
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 60 ECUs:
 Part of the money (20 ECUs) is your initial endowment.
 The rest of the money (40 ECUs) is deposited in a bank.
The bank where your money is deposited is composed of three depositors who are in the lab.
Thus, the bank has a total capital of 120 ECUs (40 ECUs from each depositor).
How can you earn money in this experiment?
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In each bank, one of the depositors is chosen randomly and she will be forced to withdraw her
deposit. The rest of the depositors may decide if they withdraw their funds from the bank
or keep them deposited until the bank carries out a project. In any case, your earnings will
depend not only on your decision, but also on how the other depositors of your bank have decided.
Moreover, the position in the line may aﬀect your earnings as we explain next.
Position in the line
To determine the sequence in which depositors make their decision, we carry out an auction.
Each depositor of the bank (the one that will be forced to withdraw and those who can choose if to
keep their money deposited or withdraw it) can submit a bid from her initial endowment (0, 1, 2,
..., 20 ECUs) that determines her position in the line. The depositor with the highest bid will be
the ﬁrst in the line, the one with the intermediate bid will be the second, and the depositor with the
lowest bid will be the third. If there is a tie in the bids the positions will be determined randomly.
The amount of money used for bidding is deducted from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs. You
will receive the amount not used for bidding at the end of the experiment as part of your earnings.
What happens if you withdraw your deposit?
The depositor who is forced to withdraw or any other depositor who chooses to with-
draw will receive 50 ECUs whenever the bank has enough funds to pay that amount.
Therefore, if you are the ﬁrst or the second depositor in the sequence of decision and you choose to
withdraw (or you are forced to do so), then you earn 50 ECUs (this amount corresponds to your
initial deposit of 40 ECUs + 10 ECUs in form of interests earned). If you are the third depositor
in the line and you choose to withdraw (or you are forced to do so), then your earnings depend on
what the other two depositors before you have decided:
 If only one of the previous two depositors (or none of them) chose to withdraw, then you also
receive 50 ECUs, because the bank has no problems to pay that amount.
 If both of the depositors who have decided before you chose to withdraw, then your earnings
amount to 20 ECUs (the amount of money that the bank has after two withdrawals).
To sum up,
What happens if you keep your money deposited?
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After paying the depositors who chose to withdraw, the bank carries out a project and pays
dividend to those depositors who decided to keep their funds in the bank.
 If two depositors choose to keep their funds deposited, then each of them earns 70 ECUs, in-
dependently of their position in the line.
 If one depositor chooses to keep her funds deposited, then she earns 30 ECUs, independently
of her position in the line.
To sum up,
As you see, it is not possible that all three depositors of the same bank decide to keep their funds
deposited. This is the case because in each bank there will be a depositor who will be forced to
withdraw her funds. This depositor (as the others) can submit her bid that determines her position
in the line, but she cannot choose between keeping the money deposited or to withdraw.
How many decisions do I have to make in this experiment?
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In this experiment we ask you to submit a bid as a depositor forced to withdraw and also as
one who can choose between keeping her funds deposited or withdrawing. In both cases, you may
submit a bid from your initial endowment (between 0 and 20 ECUs). Furthermore, we ask you to
tell us what decisions (to withdraw or to keep your funds deposited) you would make as a depositor
who can decide whether to withdraw or keep her money in the bank.
In this experiment you do not know anything about the bids and the decisions (to withdraw
or to keep the funds deposited) of the other depositors of your bank. You do not even know your
position in the line (which depends on your bid and on the bids of the other depositors of your
bank). Having in mind this information, we ask you what you would do with your deposit (keep it
in the bank or withdraw it).
What information will I have in this experiment?
Next we show you one of the screens of the experiment so that you can see the way that we
provide you the information.
(The Spanish text is the following: Period 1 of 1, Time (seconds):
We completed the auction, your bid was 0. Remember that you will be the ﬁrst, the second
or the third in the line depending on how your bid was relative to the bids of the others. Please,
decide now if you want to keep your money in the bank or you want to withdraw. We remind you
that one of the other two depositors will surely withdraw (and she submitted her bid knowing this),
and the other one will choose between keeping her money in the bank and withdrawing (and she
submitted her bid knowing this).
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Remember also your payoﬀ related to keeping your funds deposited and to withdrawal in this
stage:
 If you withdraw, then your payoﬀ may be 20 ECUs (if you are the third depositor in the
line and the previous two depositors have withdrawn) or 50 ECUs if at least one of the other
depositors keeps her funds deposited.
 If you keep your money deposited, then your payoﬀ will be 70 ECUs (if the other depositor
who can also keep her funds deposited does so) or 30 ECUs (if you are the only one who keeps
her funds deposited).
Remember that one of the other depositors will be forced to withdraw and the other one has to
choose if to withdraw her money or not, like you.
(Red buttons:) Keep the deposit in the bank
Withdraw the deposit from the bank
(In the Picture the text below the ﬁrst / second / third person is High / Intermediate / Low
bid.))
Note that in the upper panel we remind you of your bid and we tell you that you are one of the
depositors who can choose between keeping her funds in the bank and withdrawing. On the right-
hand side, in the picture you see the three depositors of the bank, ranked according to their bids
(that you do not know). On the left-hand side we remind you your payoﬀs related to withdrawal
and keeping the money deposited. Your decision can be made by clicking the corresponding button
in the lower pane.
What determines your ﬁnal earnings?
At the end of the experiment, the computer will choose randomly one of the three depositors
of the bank to be the depositor forced to withdraw. The other two will be the depositors who can
choose between keeping their funds in the bank and withdrawing. All depositors have the same
probability of being chosen as the depositor forced to withdraw.
Once the depositor forced to withdraw is selected, the computer uses the submitted bids to
determine the sequence of decision and deducts the bids from the initial endowments of 20 ECUs.
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Next, the computer tells the decision of each depositor in function of the decisions given for all
possibilities.
If you are the depositor forced to withdraw, then we deduct from your initial endowment of 20
ECUs your bid submitted as the forced depositor. And you will earn a payoﬀ in function of your
position in the line and the decision of the other depositors:
In case that you are a depositor who can choose between keeping her funds in the bank and
withdrawing, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs your bid submitted as a depositor
who can choose between keeping the money in the bank and withdrawal. And you will earn a payoﬀ
in function of your position in the line and the decision of the other depositors:
At the end of the experiment you will receive your earnings in Euros (10 ECUs = 1 Euro).
Next, we provide some examples so that you can see how the payoﬀs are calculated. Before
starting the experiment, there will be a trial round where you will be able to see the decision
screens for the bidding and the decision if to withdraw or keep the money deposited. This trial
round will not aﬀect your ﬁnal payoﬀ. We will call your attention when the phase that determines
your payoﬀ begins.
Thanks for participating!
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Example 1
Imagine depositors A, B and C and assume that the computer selects B as the depositor forced
to withdraw. Here are the bids:
These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 6 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 10 ECUs
Therefore, depositor C will be the ﬁrst, depositor B the second and depositor A the third in the
line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment, so from there depositor A will receive
15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 14 ECUs and depositor C will have 10 ECUs. This amount will
add to the earnings related to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence of decision)
1. - Depositor C: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
Depositor C and A will receive 70 ECUs and depositor B receives 50 ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 80 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 70
decision).
Now assume the following decisions:
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1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 30 ECUs for their
decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A: Withdraw
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 20 ECUs for their
decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
35 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 20 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Example 2
Imagine depositors A, B and C and assume that the computer selects C as the depositor forced
to withdraw. Here are the bids:
These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 3 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 1 ECUs
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Therefore, depositor A will be the ﬁrst, depositor B the second and depositor C the third in the
line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment, so from there depositor A will receive
15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 17 ECUs and depositor C will have 19 ECUs. This amount will
add to the earnings related to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence of decision)
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor B and C will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 30 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Keep the money deposited
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 70 ECUs and depositor C receives 50 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B receives a total of 87 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 70 decision), depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Assume the following decisions
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1. - Depositor A: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor C receives 20 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
of 65 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 39 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 20
decision).
Sequential treatment
Welcome to this experiment!
In this experiment, we study how individuals solve decision-making problems, and we are not
interested in your particular decision, but in the average behavior of individuals. That is why you
will be treated anonymously during the experiment and nobody in this room will ever know the
decisions that you make.
Next, you will see the instructions that explain how the experiment goes. These instructions are
the same for all participants and it is of utmost importance that you understand them well because
your earnings will depend to a large extent on your decisions.
At the end of the experiment we will ask you to complete a long questionnaire that contains
several games that allow you to earn extra money. The objective of the questionnaire is to get
to know your tastes and preferences (that are not obviously the same as those of the rest of the
participants) and for this reason there are no correct answers to the questions that we raise. During
the questionnaire it is important that you state your preferred option in each case because your
earnings from the questionnaire depend to a large degree of your decisions.
Remember that all the decisions that you make during the experiment are anonymous and will
not be linked to you. If you have any doubt or question during the experiment, raise your hand and
we will come to you. Remember also that you are not allowed to speak during the experiment.
What is the experiment about?
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive 60 ECUs:
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 Part of the money (20 ECUs) is your initial endowment.
 The rest of the money (40 ECUs) is deposited in a bank.
The bank where your money is deposited is composed of three depositors who are in the lab.
Thus, the bank has a total capital of 120 ECUs (40 ECUs from each depositor).
How can you earn money in this experiment?
In each bank, one of the depositors is chosen randomly and she will be forced to withdraw her
deposit. The rest of the depositors may decide if they withdraw their funds from the bank
or keep them deposited until the bank carries out a project. In any case, your earnings will
depend not only on your decision, but also on how the other depositors of your bank have decided.
Moreover, the position in the line may aﬀect your earnings as we explain next.
Position in the line
To determine the sequence in which depositors make their decision, we carry out an auction.
Each depositor of the bank (the one that will be forced to withdraw and those who can choose if to
keep their money deposited or withdraw it) can submit a bid from her initial endowment (0, 1, 2,
..., 20 ECUs) that determines her position in the line. The depositor with the highest bid will be
the ﬁrst in the line, the one with the intermediate bid will be the second, and the depositor with the
lowest bid will be the third. If there is a tie in the bids the positions will be determined randomly.
The amount of money used for bidding is deducted from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs. You
will receive the amount not used for bidding at the end of the experiment as part of your earnings.
What happens if you withdraw your deposit?
The depositor who is forced to withdraw or any other depositor who chooses to with-
draw will receive 50 ECUs whenever the bank has enough funds to pay that amount.
Therefore, if you are the ﬁrst or the second depositor in the sequence of decision and you choose to
withdraw (or you are forced to do so), then you earn 50 ECUs (this amount corresponds to your
initial deposit of 40 ECUs + 10 ECUs in form of interests earned). If you are the third depositor
in the line and you choose to withdraw (or you are forced to do so), then your earnings depend on
what the other two depositors before you have decided:
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 If only one of the previous two depositors (or none of them) chose to withdraw, then you also
receive 50 ECUs, because the bank has no problems to pay that amount.
 If both of the depositors who have decided before you chose to withdraw, then your earnings
amount to 20 ECUs (the amount of money that the bank has after two withdrawals).
To sum up,
What happens if you keep your money deposited?
After paying the depositors who chose to withdraw, the bank carries out a project and pays
dividend to those depositors who decided to keep their funds in the bank.
 If two depositors choose to keep their funds deposited, then each of them earns 70 ECUs, in-
dependently of their position in the line.
 If one depositor chooses to keep her funds deposited, then she earns 30 ECUs, independently
of her position in the line.
To sum up,
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As you see, it is not possible that all three depositors of the same bank decide to keep their funds
deposited. This is the case because in each bank there will be a depositor who will be forced to
withdraw her funds. This depositor (as the others) can submit her bid that determines her position
in the line, but she cannot choose between keeping the money deposited or to withdraw.
How many decisions do I have to make in this experiment?
In this experiment we ask you to submit a bid as a depositor forced to withdraw and also as
one who can choose between keeping her funds deposited or withdrawing. In both cases, you may
submit a bid from your initial endowment (between 0 and 20 ECUs).
In this experiment, you do not know anything about the bids submitted by the other depositors,
but you can condition your decision of withdrawing or keeping the money in the bank on what the
other depositors decided to do with their deposits, if they decided before you. Thus, we ask you
to tell us what you would like to do with your deposit (keep it deposited or withdraw it) if after
the auction you are in the ﬁrst, second or third position of the sequence of decision. Since you can
condition your choice on the decisions of the other depositors of your bank, you have to make a
decision in six potential scenarios:
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the ﬁrst in the line
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the second in the line and the ﬁrst depositor
chose to keep her money in the bank
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the second in the line and the ﬁrst depositor
chose to withdraw her funds
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line and the ﬁrst depositor chose
to withdraw her funds and the second chose to keep them deposited
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line and the ﬁrst depositor chose
to keep her funds in the bank and the second chose to withdraw them
 What do you do with your deposit if you are the third in the line and the two previous
depositors chose to withdraw their funds
Keep in mind when submitting your bid and making your decision, that the other depositors of
your bank can also condition their decision on what you decided. That is, if you are the ﬁrst in the
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line and decide to keep your money deposited or to withdraw it, the other depositors of your bank
may condition their decision on what they observe.
What information will I have in this experiment?
Next we show you one of the screens of the experiment so that you can see the way that we
provide you the information.
(The Spanish text is the following: Period 1 of 1, Time (seconds):
Suppose that you are one of the depositors who may choose between keeping her funds deposited
or withdrawing them. We have completed already the auction, your bid was 0 and after the auction
given your bid and those of the rest you are the second to arrive at the bank. The ﬁrst depositor
decided to withdraw her deposit.
Remember also your payoﬀ related to keeping your funds deposited and to withdrawal in this
stage given that you are the second in the line and the ﬁrst one withdrew her deposit:
 If you withdraw, then you earn 50 ECUs.
 If you keep your money deposited, then your payoﬀ will be 70 ECUs if the other depositor who
can also keep her funds deposited does so or 30 ECUs if that depositor decides to withdraw.
Remember that the next depositor will observe your decision and also the decision of the ﬁrst
depositor. Remember also that one of the other depositors is forced to withdraw and the other one
has to choose if to withdraw her money or not, like you.
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(Red buttons:) Keep the deposit in the bank
Withdraw the deposit from the bank
(In the Picture the text below the ﬁrst / second / third person is High / Intermediate / Low
bid, and the text above the ﬁrst / second person is Withdraw / You.))
Note that in the upper pane we tell you that you are one of the depositors who can choose
between keeping her funds in the bank and withdrawing. We also tell you your position in the
line and the decisions of the previous depositor. You can see it also on the right-hand side in the
picture where you can see that you are the second in the line and that the ﬁrst one has decided
to withdraw. On the left-hand side we remind you your payoﬀs related to withdrawal and keeping
the money deposited. Your decision can be made by clicking the corresponding button in the lower
pane.
What determines your ﬁnal earnings?
At the end of the experiment, the computer will choose randomly one of the three depositors
of the bank to be the depositor forced to withdraw. The other two will be the depositors who can
choose between keeping their funds in the bank and withdrawing. All depositors have the same
probability of being chosen as the depositor forced to withdraw.
Once the depositor forced to withdraw is selected, the computer uses the submitted bids to
determine the sequence of decision and deducts the bids from the initial endowments of 20 ECUs.
Next, the computer tells the decision of each depositor in function of the decisions given for all
possibilities.
If you are the depositor forced to withdraw, then we deduct from your initial endowment of 20
ECUs your bid submitted as the forced depositor. And you will earn a payoﬀ in function of your
position in the line and the decision of the other depositors:
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In case that you are a depositor who can choose between keeping her funds in the bank and
withdrawing, we deduct from your initial endowment of 20 ECUs your bid submitted as a depositor
who can choose between keeping the money in the bank and withdrawal. And you will earn a payoﬀ
in function of your position in the line and the decision of the other depositors:
At the end of the experiment you will receive your earnings in Euros (10 ECUs = 1 Euro).
Next, we provide some examples so that you can see how the payoﬀs are calculated. Before
starting the experiment, there will be a trial round where you will be able to see the decision
screens for the bidding and the decision if to withdraw or keep the money deposited. This trial
round will not aﬀect your ﬁnal payoﬀ. We will call your attention when the phase that determines
your payoﬀ begins.
Thanks for participating!
Example 1
Imagine depositors A, B and C and assume that the computer selects B as the depositor forced
to withdraw. Here are the bids:
These are then the bids that determine the position:
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Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 6 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 10 ECUs
Therefore, depositor C will be the ﬁrst, depositor B the second and depositor A the third in
the line. Remember that when depositor B decides (the second in the line), she will observe the
decision of depositor C (who decides ﬁrst) and depositor A (the last one to decide) observes both
the decision of depositor C and that of depositor B. The bids will be deducted from the initial
endowment, so from there depositor A will receive 15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 14 ECUs and
depositor C will have 10 ECUs. This amount will add to the earnings related to withdrawing or
keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence of decision)
1. - Depositor C: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing that the ﬁrst one keeps the money in the bank and the second
withdraws): Keep the money deposited
Depositor C and A will receive 70 ECUs and depositor B receives 50 ECUs for their decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 80 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 70
decision).
Now assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing two withdrawals): Keep the money deposited
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 30 ECUs for their
decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
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endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Assume the following decisions:
1. - Depositor C: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B: Withdraw (Forced)
3. - Depositor A (after observing two withdrawals): Withdraw
Then depositor C and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 20 ECUs for their
decisions.
These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total of
35 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 20 decision), depositor B receives a total of 64 ECUs (14 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 60 ECUs (10 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Example 2
Imagine depositors A, B and C and assume that the computer selects C as the depositor forced
to withdraw. Here are the bids:
These are then the bids that determine the position:
Bid of depositor A: 5 ECUs
Bid of depositor B: 3 ECUs
Bid of depositor C: 1 ECUs
Therefore, depositor A will be the ﬁrst, depositor B the second and depositor C the third in the
line. These bids will be deducted from the initial endowment, so from there depositor A will receive
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15 ECUs, depositor B will receive 17 ECUs and depositor C will have 19 ECUs. This amount will
add to the earnings related to withdrawing or keeping the funds deposited.
For instance, assume the following decisions (ranked according to the sequence of decision)
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B (after observing that the ﬁrst kept her funds deposited): Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor B and C will receive 50 ECUs and depositor A receives 30 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
of 45 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 30 decision), depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50
decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Withdraw
2. - Depositor B (after observing that the ﬁrst withdrew): Withdraw
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 50 ECUs and depositor C receives 20 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
of 65 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 50 decision), depositor B receives a total of 67 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 50 decision), depositor C receives a total of 39 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 20
decision).
Assume the following decisions
1. - Depositor A: Keep the money deposited
2. - Depositor B (after observing that the ﬁrst kept her funds deposited): Keep the money
deposited
3. - Depositor C: Withdraw (Forced)
Then depositor A and B will receive 70 ECUs and depositor C receives 50 ECUs for their
decisions. These earnings add to the earnings resulting from the bid, so depositor A receives a total
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of 85 ECUs (15 initial endowment + 70 decision), depositor B receives a total of 87 ECUs (17 initial
endowment + 70 decision), depositor C receives a total of 69 ECUs (19 initial endowment + 50
decision).
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Appendix D: Individual characteristics and bids
We move now to see how individual traits aﬀect the size of the bid. We begin with Figure 2 that
shows raw correlations between individual traits and bids in the diﬀerent informational environments
as impatient and patient depositors.27
Figure 2: Raw correlations between individual traits and bidding as impatient / patient depositors
in diﬀerent information setups (*/**/*** denotes signiﬁcance at the 10/5/1% level.)
Starting from the bottom of Figure 2, we can observe that in case of Social Value Orientation
and the Big Five personality traits the (absolute value of the) correlations is rather low and none is
signiﬁcant at conventional signiﬁcance levels. Therefore, it seems that the individual traits captured
by these measures are not related to the bids submitted either as an impatient or a patient depositor
in the simultaneous or sequential setup.
The same is true about family income and trust in banks (and in general in institutions).
Interestingly, uncertainty attitudes measured by our risk and ambiguity aversion measures show no
signiﬁcant correlation with the bids in any role and in any informational environment.
27We do not correct here for multiple testing because we just wish to have a ﬁrst look at the data and we do not
want to draw too far-fetched conclusions.
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The rest of the variables exhibits at least some signiﬁcant correlation with the bids in some
cases. Age is positively correlated with bids in 3 out of 4 cases, indicating that older depositors
tend to bid higher amounts (mostly in the sequential setup).28 As impatient depositors females
tend to submit signiﬁcantly lower bids. Loss aversion is weakly negatively correlated with bids,
suggesting that more loss-averse depositors tend to bid less, contrary to our conjecture. Cognitive
abilities correlate positively / negatively with bids submitted as the impatient / patient depositor,
and in two cases these correlations are signiﬁcant. We have no good story why the eﬀect of cognitive
abilities should vary with the type of the depositor. The eﬀect of overconﬁdence is also somewhat
ambiguous, though it seems to reduce bids in the sequential setup.
28Age in our sample ranges from 18 to 63, with an average of 22.7, so we have a rather young pool with some older
participants, so this result should be taken with a pinch of salt.
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